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HEARSAY IN ILLINOIS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that the hearsay rule is one of the fundamental

and most discussed rules of evidence, recent case law continues to
suggest that both lawyers and judges do not sufficiently understand
the rule and its exceptions. This view is further borne out by numerous
discussions this author has had with judges and lawyers at various
continuing legal education seminars. Much of the uncertainty and
difficulty with the rule centers around such issues as: the difference
between hearsay and non-hearsay use of out of court statements;
prior statements of witnesses (including prior identifications) as an
exception in criminal cases; and all the various kinds of admissions.
Other areas causing confusion include: hearsay statements as a basis
for expert opinion under Wilson v. Clark;' judgments of conviction
as evidence; declarations against interest; and the possibility of Illinois
recognizing a so-called "catchall" or general trustworthiness exception
to the rule.
Although the foregoing do not exhaust the hearsay issues that
could be discussed, they, nonetheless, are a representative sample of
the issues that typically cause trouble for lawyers and judges trying
to apply the hearsay rule and its exceptions. Moreover, two recently
crafted statutory exemptions from the rule for prior inconsistent
statements 2 and prior identifications,3 just now reaching the appellate
courts, make the time ripe for a look at how such statutes are being
interpreted.
The purpose of this article is to set out the basic principles that
govern some of the typical, recurring hearsay problems and hopefully
provide some guidance for lawyers and judges who must wrestle with
these issues on a daily basis.

II.

DEFINITION OF HEARSAY

Hearsay is defined as an out of court statement used to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. It is excluded because the truth or
falsity of an out of court statement depends on the credibility of the
declarant who (ordinarily) is neither in court nor subject to cross-

examination .4
1. 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (1987).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-12 (1987).

4. See People v. Lopez, 152 Ill. App. 3d 667, 672, 504 N.E.2d 862, 866 (1987);
People v. Rogers, 81 111. 2d 571, 577-78, 411 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1980); People v.
Carpenter, 28 111. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963).
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Although the definition itself has only two elements ("out of
court statement" and "used to prove the truth of the matter asserted"), there are at least six underlying principles or components to
the concept of hearsay. These are:
The person in the witness chair,
1. A Witness
under oath. (There can be
many "witnesses" to an incident, but there can be only one
WITNESS, one person in the
chair at any given time for
hearsay purposes.)
A person who has made a
2. A Declarant
statement "out of court."
The words used or acts done
3. The Statement
by the declarant that assert
something.
What the declarant intended to
4. The Matter Asserted by the
and did assert by his words or
Statement
acts.
What the lawyer's purpose is
5. The Purpose for Which the
in having the witness repeat
is
Offered
Statement
the declarant's out of court
statement.
Whether the declarant will tes6. The Possibility of Testing
tify and be subject to crossthe
Deof
the Credibility
examination as to his sincerity,
clarant by Cross
ambiguity, accuracy of memory, and accuracy of perception.
Thus, when a witness on the stand testifies to an out of court
statement made by a declarant and offers the testimony to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the declarant's statement, the witness'
testimony is excludable hearsay. For example, if a witness testifies
that a bystander told him that "the truck exploded just as it hit the
bridge," the witness' repetition of the declarant's statement is hearsay
if used to convince the trier of fact that the accident happened just
as the declarant said it did. The party opposing the testimony has no
way of testing the sincerity of the declarant, his ability to correctly
perceive or remember the incident, or even what he meant by saying
the truck exploded when it "hit the bridge." Thus, when hearsay is
allowed, the opponent has no opportunity to test the declarant's
memory, perception, sincerity, or meaning.
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Although the foregoing principles are well established rules of
black letter law, occasionally hearsay will slip by a trial court. For
example, in People v. Lopez,5 an officer investigating a shooting death
was allowed to testify that when he opened up the back door of the
squadrol transporting the defendant, a woman looked in and screamed
"'that's him, that's him there" and that other people then came
running out of a tavern and started screaming "that's him." '6 The
unnamed woman's statement did not qualify as a spontaneous utterance because the shooting incident had occurred at the taverin one
and one-half hours before the squadrol arrived. 7 The only possible
use such statement could have had was to prove the truth of the
matter asserted: "That man was the Shooter." The statement was
therefore hearsay.
Although hearsay can be considered harmless error when it is not
used as either a substitute for an in court identification' or "used to
strengthen or corroborate a weak identification, " 9 the Lopez court
was "not convinced that the jury would have found [the] identification
of defendant to be as strong ... in the absence of the State's
introduction and repeated exploitation of the squadrol identifications."' 0 The defendant's conviction was therefore reversed.
In Lopez, some of the hearsay was not initially objected to.
However, the court stated that "[b]ecause of the cumulative impact
of the unobjected-to and objected-to instances concerning this testimony .... justice dictates we ignore waiver of this issue."" Ordinarily, unobjected-to hearsay can be used to prove the truth of the matter
2
asserted.
III.
A.

NON-HEARSAY

DEFINITION

It is important to remember that not all out of court statements
are hearsay. Out of court statements not used to prove the truth of

5. 152 Il. App. 3d 667, 504 N.E.2d 862 (1987).
6. People v. Lopez, 152 IlI. App. 3d 667, 673, 504 N.E.2d 862, 866 (1987).
7. Id. at 675, 504 N.E.2d at 867.
8. See id. at 676, 504 N.E.2d at 868 (citing People v. Anthony, 90 Il. App.
3d 859, 418 N.E.2d 757 (1980)).
9. Id.

10. Id. at 676-77, 504 N.E.2d at 868-69.
11. Id. at 676, 504 N.E.2d at 868.
12. See People v. Merideth, 152 Ill. App. 3d 304, 314, 503 N.E.2d 1132, 1141

(1987).
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the matter asserted therein are not excludable as hearsay. They will
be thus admissible if relevant and otherwise competent.
In People v. Britz, 3 for example, the court held that tapes of
defendant's conversations with a youth counselor, even though they
contained some self-serving denials of involvement by the defendant,
should have been admitted to show the possible seductive effect the
counselor's urgings may have had in connection with the defendant's
later confession.' 4 Because the defendant was attracted to the counselor, the court concluded that "he, in a twisted way, might have
thought Penman [the counselor] would be impressed by the confessions.'' 1 Hearsay, therefore, was not involved, "as the stimulating
language of Penman is admissible not for its truth, but for its effect
on the [defendant].' ' 6 The tapes were being used as circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's state of mind, not for the truth of the
7
matter asserted, and it was reversible error to exclude them.
Similarly, in People v. Gaurige,'8 a voluntary manslaughter case,
it was held that the trial court should have allowed defendant to
introduce the properly authenticated 911 tape of his own phone call
to the 911 operator after he had hit the victim with a liquor bottle.' 9
The tape was an out of court statement; however, the defendant did
not seek to use it to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather,
he intended to show "that he was frantic, fearful, and agitated at the
time he called 911 and that he subjectively believed that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm." ' 20 Although the
tape was not hearsay, the court held that excluding it was not
2
reversible error. '
B. OTHER EXAMPLES OF STATEMENTS NOT USED TO PROVE THE
TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED

Common examples of out of court statements used to prove
something other than "the truth of the matter asserted" are the

13. 112 Il1. 2d 314, 493 N.E.2d 575 (1986).
14. People v. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d 314, 319-20, 493 N.E.2d 575, 577 (1986).
15. Id. at 320, 493 N.E.2d at 577.
16. Id. at 320, 493 N.E.2d at 578.
17. Id. at 320-21, 493 N.E.2d at 578.
18. 168 Il. App. 3d 855, 522 N.E.2d 1306 (1988).
19. People v. Gaurige, 168 Ill. App. 3d 855, 862-64, 522 N.E.2d 1306, 131011(1988).
20. Id. at 864, 522 N.E.2d at 1311.
21. Id.
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following: statements to show notice or warning, 22 for example, "lady
look out for the ketchup on the floor!"; to show threats or duress, 23
for example, "the gang members told me I had to carry this gun or
they would shoot me!"; and statements introduced to prove an oral
24
contract or its terms.
The foregoing are generally considered not to be hearsay because
they have a legal significance that is independent of the truth of the
declaration or the sincerity of the declarant. The "independent significance" is often the effect such statements have on the person hearing
them; for example, they amount to duress, notice, or warning. Even
if the declarant did not intend to warn, or give notice, or threaten, if
he used words that achieved that effect, those words can be introduced
into evidence. The mere making of these kinds of statements, when
relevant, has legal consequences for the resolution of the case. Such
out of court statements are therefore not excludable as hearsay.
In Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc.,2 for example, statements
made by the corporate defendant's farm manager concerning the
terms of a horse breeding contract were properly admitted to show
the contract terms contemplated at the time the contract was signed.
The statements were admitted simply to show that they were made.
Whether the farm manager was authorized by the corporate defendant
to make such statements and whether such statements would therefore
be weighed as admissions were held to be matters for the jury to
decide. 26 A judgment for plaintiff for breach of the breeding contract
was affirmed.
People v. Wilson, 27 is also an example of an out of court
statement used to show something other than the truth of the matter
asserted. In this murder and armed robbery case, a police officer
testified that, after a conversation with a person who was defendant's
accomplice, he proceeded to gather information on defendant. The
officer did not testify as to the contents of the conversation or reveal
22. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Combs, 273 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1960) ("Please
don't step in that ketchup" was.a statement as to the fact of warning-a prime
element in the defense-and therefore not covered by the hearsay rule).
23. See Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, 100 SOLICITOR'S J. 566 (1956), reprinted in J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 91 (6th ed. 1987) (statements made to defendant

amounted to duress and were not hearsay).
24. See Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 452, 502 N.E.2d 806
(1986); see also infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
25. 151 Ill. App. 3d 452, 502 N.E.2d 806 (1986).

26. Lundberg, 151 I11.
App. 3d at 459, 502 N.E.2d at 811.
27. 168 I11.App. 3d 847, 523 N.E.2d 43 (1988).
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that the accomplice had been convicted of a crime. The court affirmed
the admission of the testimony stating, "[w]here such testimony is
confined strictly to the officer's physical activities, the bare occurrence
of the conversation and the testimony is subject to cross-examination,
' 28
this evidence is not within the legal definition of hearsay.
C.

VERBAL ACTS

Where an act requires spoken words to complete it, and the act
is done and the words are said at the same time, the words are
considered part of a "verbal act" and are not hearsay. Examples
include the statement by a donor, when giving a birthday gift, "this
is for your birthday" and a statement by a tenant when giving money
to his landlord, "this is for the rent." ' 29 To qualify as a verbal act,
the words must be said at the time the act is done. For example, a
customer's statement to a bank officer that "the money I sent in
yesterday was for the loan" would be hearsay if used to show a
payment on the loan had been made. Verbal acts are generally singled
out as examples of "non-hearsay," but they are also just another
example of words having "independent legal significance."
D.

STATEMENTS ADMISSIBLE FOR ONE PURPOSE; INADMISSIBLE FOR

ANOTHER

When a statement can have a hearsay use and a non-hearsay use
(an impermissible and a permissible use), the general rule is that such

evidence is admissible for its permitted (non-hearsay) use as long as
its probative value on the permitted purpose is not outweighed by the
prejudicial effect it may have if the jury uses it as hearsay to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
In People v. Monroe,3 ° a drug sale case against defendant Monroe, an Illinois Bureau of Investigation agent testified that he had

made prior purchases from a non-defendant, Ghigi, who was involved
in the sale by defendant. On appeal, the supreme court held that the
relevance of prior purchases by Ghigi, as background information to
show why the IBI officer approached Ghigi, was sufficient to allow
evidence of those purchases to be admissible even though it might
have some prejudicial spill-over effect on defendant. The probative
force of Ghigi's drug selling as background information was not

28. People v. Wilson, 168 11. App. 3d 847, 850, 523 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1988).
29. See generally Hanson v. Johnson, 161 Minn. 229, 201 N.W. 322 (1924).
30. 66 Ill. 2d 317, 362 N.E.2d 295 (1977).
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outweighed by the danger that the jury would use it to conclude that

the defendant associated with drug pushers. 3
This so called "narrow purpose/broad purpose" rule (evidence
admissible for a narrow purpose/inadmissible for a broader purpose)

was used in People v. Escobar 2 to exclude a statement because the
danger of its hearsay use was great and the probative value of its
background for the arrest was small to non-existent. In this murder

case, a witness' testimony that he gave a shell casing to police because
he had been told it came from defendant's car was inadmissible to
show the casing came from defendant's car. To the State's argument
that it was using the statement only to show why the witness brought
the shell to the police, the court responded that "the danger [of] the

jury misus[ing] the evidence [was] so much greater than [its] value
[in] detailing why the witness went to the police that the evidence
should have been excluded."" The conviction was therefore reversed.
E. OUT OF COURT ACTS AS HEARSAY,. ASSERTIVE VS. NON-ASSERTIVE
CONDUCT

Hearsay statements generally involve words and verbal expres-

sions. However, out of court acts can also be hearsay if they are
"intended" by the actor/declarant to be assertions on an issue in the
34
case and are used to prove the truth of such assertions.
31. See People v. Monroe, 66 I11. 2d 317, 323, 362 N.E.2d 295, 297 (1977).
Defendant Monroe's conviction was ultimately reversed because of improper admission of hearsay and other errors.
32. 77 I11.App. 3d 169, 395 N.E.2d 1028 (1979).
33. People v. Escobar, 77 I11.App. 3d 169, 177, 395 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (1979).
34. "The definition of hearsay itself is deceptively simple and is generally
accepted to be testimony of an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth
of the matter asserted therein, and resting for its value upon the credibility of the
out-of-court asserter." People v. Rogers, 81 111. 2d 571, 577, 411 N.E.2d 223, 226
(1980). Federal rule 801(a) defines hearsay similarly as "(1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
The federal rule explicitly states that non-verbal conduct can be an assertion
only if the actor/declarant intends it to be an assertion. Illinois law does not explicitly
state that conduct is assertive only if the actor/declarant intends it be assertive, but
it is likely an Illinois court would hold that way and follow the federal rule under
most circumstances. A case where Illinois might not strictly follow the federal rule is
the following scenario suggested at a recent Illinois Judicial Conference by Professor
Jamie Carey of Loyola University School of Law.
A man and his wife are attacked in their home by an intruder. The intruder
flees. The man, bleeding profusely, gets in his car with his wife and starts to drive
to the hospital. A few hundred yards from their driveway a man appears in the car's
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Courts have recognized that "assertive conduct, as well as verbal
statements, may be inadmissible hearsay." 35 In People v. Higgs,a6 the
court held that testimony that the defendant was attacked by bystand-

ers when the police arrived was being used to show that the bystanders
"said" out of court that the defendant killed the deceased. Defendant's conviction was therefore reversed because the out of court
actors were held to be asserting by their acts that the defendant was
the killer and the State was asking the jury to accept those assertions
7

as true.1

When out of court acts are not intended by the actor to be an
assertion of an issue in the case, such out of court acts are said to be
headlights. As the car pulls near the runner, it suddenly swerves and hits the runner
squarely, knocking him off the road. The driver never says anything and subsequently
dies from his injuries. The runner is charged with the home invasion. The State wants
to call the wife to testify to the driver's conduct. The State's argument is that the
driver never intended to "assert" anything, but just probably intended to hurt the
runner. That act, the State argues, is something from which the jury may "infer"
the driver's probable but unexpressed belief. (This is the intruder.) In other words,
even though the driver was not sending a message, the jury could "infer" one
anyway. There would be no danger of "lying" because the driver was not trying to
"assert anything." Because there was no "conduct" intended to be an assertion,
under the federal rule, there would be no hearsay.
An Illinois court, although it might acknowledge that there was no act "intended" to be an assertion (and thus no assertion or danger of insincerity), might,
nonetheless, conclude that the act is not admissible because the danger of ambiguity
is too great. Further, there is also the danger that the jury might treat it as an
assertion, as hearsay, for the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, even if an act
was not intended to be an assertion, an Illinois court might still exclude the act from
evidence if ambiguity creates too great a risk that the jury would consider the act for
hearsay purposes.
One might argue that the act, even if hearsay, should be admitted as an excited
utterance or dying declaration, but this would require a ruling that there is enough
evidence to conclude that the declarant intended to hit the runner as opposed to the
declarant having a seizure or falling on the steering wheel as he lost consciousness.
As to how much evidence is needed to find a statement or act admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule, see Redmon v. Austin, 188 Ill. App. 3d 220, 543
N.E.2d 1351 (1989) (rescue worker's testimony that someone "he believed to be" an
occupant of car involved in collision told him the driver had lost control of the car
was not admissible either as an admission or an excited utterance when rescue worker
admitted on cross-examination that he did not know then and could not tell now
who made the declaration (occupant or non-occupant) and there was not enough
evidence that the declarant (whoever it was) had witnessed the facts he asserted.).
35. People v. Higgs, 11 11. App. 3d 1032, 1037, 298 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1973)
55, 195 N.E. 443 (1935) and People v. Hazen, 104
(citing People v. Reeves, 360 I11.
I11.
App. 2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 424 (1969)).
36. 11 111. App. 3d 1032, 298 N.E.2d 283 (1973).
37. Id. at 1037, 298 N.E.2d at 288.

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 168 1989-1990

1990:159]

HEARSAY IN ILLINOIS

"non-assertive" conduct and are not excludable as hearsay. Such acts
are thus used to show the probable, but unexpressed, belief of the
actor. Examples of conduct used to show such implied belief include
"silence," 3 8 under certain circumstances, as well as calls by unknown
declarants to a phone number the State charges is used for gambling.3 9
The key to whether an out of court act is assertive is whether the
court believes the actor was intending to assert or express something
on an issue in the case.4 If the actor had no such intention, there is
no assertion, no out of court "statement," and the conduct is not
hearsay. Moreover, because no "assertion" was intended, there can
be no "truth of the matter asserted." Such conduct may then, if
relevant, be ordinary, ambiguous, circumstantial evidence to show
4
what he probably believed. 1
The difference between assertive and non-assertive conduct is
that, if the actor does not intend to assert anything on an issue in the
case, his conduct does not have the danger of insincerity that a bald,
out of court, direct assertion would have. His conduct is merely
analogous to, not the same as, an out of court assertion. However,
though this "non-assertive conduct" thus avoids the risk of insincerity, it still carries with it the risk of ambiguity because the "probable"
belief of the actor may not be his actual belief.
Examples of assertive conduct include any pointing out or signalling by the declarant that is intended to be assertive (intended to
be a message) on an issue in the case. For example, a police officer
testifies that when he asked who the owner of the gun was, a bystander
pointed to the defendant. Or the officer testifies that when he asked
"Where is Smith?", a bystander pointed to defendant. The conduct
here is used to prove what the actor intended to say without using
words.
Non-assertive conduct generally involves acts of a declarant which
circumstantially show the actor's probable but unexpressed belief as
to a state of affairs. The issue in such cases will usually be the
relevance of the actor's probable unexpressed belief (that was acted
upon) to the issues in the case.
38. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
40. When confronted with an out of court act that may not have been intended
to be an assertion, the trial court must decide the declarant's intent on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. If it is determined that the declarant intended by his act to
make an assertion on an issue in the case, the statement is excludable as hearsay just
as if the declarant had made an explicit out of court statement.
41. See generally FED. R. Evm. 801(a)(2); Advisory Committee's Note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 293 (1973).
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The classic, apocryphal example of non-assertive conduct involves
a witness who testifies that he saw a ship captain inspect a vessel
from stem to stern before setting sail on it with his family. 42 The
conduct of the captain, if used to show his probable but unexpressed
belief that the vessel was seaworthy, is non-assertive conduct. Its
relevance is not as a direct assertion (the vessel is seaworthy) but as
circumstantial evidence that he probably believed the vessel was
seaworthy because he put his family on it and sailed away.
Although such non-assertive conduct is admitted because it does
not have the danger of insincerity, there are other dangers. For
example, with regard to the ship captain, suppose the trial court is
wrong in "guessing" what his unexpressed belief was. Suppose his
actual, unexpressed belief was, "This ship is leaky and in terrible
shape, but I'll risk it." Such dangers, however, have not been
sufficient to exclude non-assertive conduct if it is relevant. The usual
response is that non-assertive conduct is being used as circumstantial
evidence and that all circumstantial evidence is ambiguous in the sense
4
that it is always consistent with more than one theory. 1
Other examples of non-assertive conduct would be: testimony by
a witness that he saw a man walking down a wet street with an opened
umbrella over his head, introduced to show it was probably raining
(conduct of the declarant to show his probable, unexpressed belief);
and testimony by a nurse that a patient was being treated in the AIDS
ward of the hospital, introduced to show the patient probably had
AIDS (conduct of the hospital to show its probable, unexpressed
belief). In both of these examples, the conduct is being used as
circumstantial evidence, and, in both, the actual belief could be
different from the "probable" belief. For example, in the first case,
the man with the umbrella could have been trying out his new
umbrella, and, in the second, the hospital could have put the patient
in the AIDS ward because he was also being treated with an experi42. This example is discussed in the case of Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep.
488, 516 (Exch. Ch. 1837). See also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 73738 (3d ed. 1984).
43. See, e.g., People v. Rhodes, 85 Ill. 2d 241, 422 N.E.2d 605 (1981) (The
presence of the defendant's "fresh" fingerprint at victim's residence is enough
circumstantial evidence of burglary to allow a jury to find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presence of the defendant's fingerprint is consistent
with the theory that he was the burglar and is also consistent with the theory that he
came on the scene after the burglary occurred. Cases based on circumstantial evidence
go to a jury because the evidence is consistent with either guilt or innocence, and the
jury must decide if it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution's
theory is true.).
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mental new drug. These difficulties, however, are difficulties with
"ambiguity," not sincerity, and have not been considered sufficient
to exclude the non-assertive conduct or other circumstantial evidence."
1. Silence as Non-Assertive Conduct
Silence on the part of an actor/declarant can, at times, be found
to be "non-assertive conduct" that is admissible as circumstantial
evidence of what the declarant probably believed. Such conduct is
thus used to show the probable but unexpressed belief of the actor/
declarant.
In Silver v. New York Central Railroad, 45 a plaintiff brought suit
against a railroad for failing to keep adequate heat in a railway
passenger car. The appellate court ruled that a railway porter was
improperly prohibited from testifying at trial that eleven other passengers made no complaint to him as to the temperature in the car.
The court held that the silence of the passengers should have been
admissible as non-assertive conduct to show their probable but unexpressed belief that the temperature was proper." However, had the
porter testified that he asked if anyone in the car was cold and got
no response, then the silence of the declarants would likely have been
47
assertive and inadmissible.
In Blackwell v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,4 s a slip and fall
case, the Illinois appellate court held there was no error in allowing
the defendant bank's maintenance contractor to answer a question as
to whether any of the bank's customers had ever complained to him
about falling on a floor where a particular type of wax was used.49
The court, while questioning the relevance of the matter, concluded
the statement presented no hearsay problem.10 The declarants were
the people who said nothing, and their out of court statement was
44. For an example of when ambiguity will prevent an act from being considered
admissible as non-assertive conduct see supra note 34.
45. 329 Mass. 14, 105 N.E.2d 923 (1952).
46. Silver v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 329 Mass. 14, 21, 105 N.E.2d 923, 926-27
(1952).
47. Id. ("This would not seem to be a situation where one might prefer to
remain silent rather than to make any statement. Indeed if the car was too cold,
ordinary prudence might seem to require that one speak out ....
[t]he uniform result
of silence in the cases of a large number of passengers ...

would not be inconclusive."

Id. at 21, 105 N.E.2d at 927.
48. 80 I11.App. 3d 188, 399 N.E.2d 326 (1980).
49. See Blackwell v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 80 I11.App. 3d 188, 193,
399 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1980).
50. See id.

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 171 1989-1990

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

their silence. Because they likely did not intend to assert anything by
their silence, that silence was non-assertive conduct and non-hearsay.
The silence was, at most, circumstantial evidence on the issue of the
dangerousness, or lack thereof.
2. "Bookie Joint" Exception: Phoned in Bets as Non-Assertive
Conduct
Another instance in which an actor's conduct has been used to
show his probable, unexpressed belief is in the so-called "bookie
joint" cases when the prosecution wants to use phone calls from
unidentified declarants to a phone number as evidence that the
location is being used as a gambling house. In People v. Roti,5 ' for
example, a police officer was properly allowed to testify to the out
of court conduct of unknown callers (placing bets) to show their
probable, but not explicitly expressed, belief that they were dealing
with a betting parlor. The court found no hearsay in the callers'
statements (possibly, "Place two dollars on Blue Note in the Fifth")
and stated that a contrary conclusion would be warranted only if the
callers' statements had contained explicit assertions that the address
was being used as a betting parlor52 (perhaps, "This is the best bookie
joint we have ever had in the neighborhood, keep up the good
work."). Thus, the conduct of the callers, as evidence of their
probable unexpressed belief, was used as circumstantial evidence that
defendant's premises were being used as a betting parlor.
IV.

PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES AS HEARSAY

Prior out of court statements of a witness have generally been
considered hearsay and inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted therein.53 This has been so even though the "witness" and
the declarant were the same person and the witness was in court and
54
subject to cross-examination about the statements made out of court.
Prior statements of witnesses are of two types: those that are
consistent with what the witness is testifying to in court and those
that are inconsistent with what the witness has just said in court.
Prior consistent statements can be used only in limited circumstances
to bolster in court testimony. Prior inconsistent statements are not
hearsay when used to impeach because they are not being used for

51. 2 Ill. App. 3d 264, 276 N.E.2d 480 (1971).

52. See People v. Roti, 2 Ill.
App. 3d 264, 270, 276 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1971).
53. See People v. Collins, 49 Ill.
2d 179, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971).

54. See id. at 183, 274 N.E.2d at 85.
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their truth but only to show that, on another occasion, the witness
said something different from what he is saying in court. Prior
inconsistent statements may be used for substantive purposes in Illinois
only in criminal cases in situations specified by statute.55
A.

PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

When prior statements are consistent, litigants sometimes seek to
use them to bolster the in court testimony, the notion being that the
fact that a witness has said the same thing many times before trial
will make the trial testimony more believable. The law, however,
excludes such prior consistent statements as hearsay because the jury
is being asked to accept them as true.
1. Admissible to Rebut a Charge of Recent Fabrication
There are, however, two exceptions to the rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible hearsay. Under the first exception,
prior consistent statements are admissible if they are used to rebut
the charge of a witness' recent fabrication. In other words, if the
opponent, through cross-examination or otherwise, charges that the
witness is lying and has just made up the story testified to, the
proponent may show that, prior to trial, his witness has made
statements that are consistent with what he is testifying to at trial.
have been made before the
The prior statements, however, must
6
lie.
to
motive
witness has had any
"[A] prior consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of
recent fabrication is admissible only if the declarant told the same
story before the motive came into existence or before the time of the
alleged fabrication."" For example, in People v. Silvestro, 8 a State's
accomplice witness was questioned on cross-examination about dis55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (1985) (prior inconsistent statements).
For a discussion of para. 115-10.1, see infra notes 67-101 and accompanying text.

See also ch. 38, 115-12 (prior identifications). For a discussion of para. 115-12, see
infra notes 144-157 and accompanying text.
56. See People v. Andino, 99 Ill. App. 3d 952, 425 N.E.2d 1333 (1981) (where

the motive to lie-to get a lighter sentence by framing other inmates-was the same
on the day of the attack as it was at trial; the witness' post-attack consistent
statements could not be used by the State to rebut the charge of recent fabrication;
conviction reversed and remanded because of improper bolstering of the complainant's testimony with prior consistent statements).
57. Id. at 955, 425 N.E.2d at 1336 (citing People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 288
N.E.2d 363 (1972)).
58. 148 Ill. App. 3d 980, 500 N.E.2d 456 (1986).
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crepancies between statements made prior to trial and his testimony
at trial, and the defense raised the issue of what promises were made
to the witness to testify. The prior consistent statements of the witness
were held properly used by the State on rebuttal.5 9 Presumably the
prior consistent statements of the witness were made prior to his
arrest or charge, at a time when he would have had no motive to
falsify his testimony in exchange for a better deal.
2.

Consistent PriorIdentifications Admissible

The second exception to the rule excluding prior consistent statements as hearsay involves statements that are "prior identifications."
As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Shum,60 "the
general rule that witnesses may not testify as to statements made out
of court to corroborate their testimony given at trial does not apply
6
to statements of identification."1 '
A recent statute also allows the substantive use of prior identifications in criminal cases. It provides that a statement "is not rendered
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing, and (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification
6
of a person made after perceiving him. 1
It should be noted that a prior identification is more than a mere
"prior accusation." For example, "Lucky is the one who shot me"
is a mere accusation, not a identification under the statute. An
identification "made after perceiving him" means an identification at
the time of a subsequent sighting of the person, after the initial
sighting at the incident. This "second" sighting, or picking out, or
pointing out, can be from photographs, or "identi-kit" type drawings,
63
or can be made in person.
Thus, although prior consistent statements can be used to bolster
in court testimony only in limited situations, prior (consistent) identifications can generally be used to bolster in court identifications.
59. See People v. Silvestro, 148 Ill. App. 3d 980, 986, 500 N.E.2d 456, 461

(1986).
60. 117 Ill. 2d 317, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (1987) (no error in allowing in court
identification to be bolstered by prior identifications; conviction and death sentence
for murder of victim and unborn child affirmed).
61. People v. Shum, 117 11. 2d 317, 342, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (1987) (citing
People v. Rogers, 81 111. 2d 571, 578-79, 411 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1980)).
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-12 (1985) ("Substantive admissibility of
prior identification").
63. See People v. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d 571, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980).
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Although, in theory, prior identifications made at or near the
time of the incident are said to be reliable because of their closeness
in time to the incident, they need not be made close in time to be
admissible. In People v. Arteman, 64 for example, a prior identification
made out of court on the day of trial was held properly admitted as
substantive evidence to bolster an in court identification. Although it
has been said that the basis for allowing prior identifications in
evidence is that an earlier identification is more likely to be accurate
than a later one, the Arteman court held that, because there is nothing
in People v. Rogers, section 115-12, or federal rule 801(d)(l)(C) that
requires a "substantial interval between the prior identification and

65
the in court identification, . . . none is required." Also, in People

v. Robinson,O a prior identification made in court (as opposed to a
typical out of court identification) was held admissible as substantive
evidence. The court wrote:
We think the identification testimony exception to the hearsay
rule contained in section 115-12 properly embraces not only
prior statements of identification made at a lineup, showup or
photo session, but also those made under oath at a67 hearing,
former trial or in the secrecy of a grand jury room.
B.

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Prior inconsistent statements have traditionally been considered
hearsay and inadmissible for substantive purposes; they could not be
used to make a prima facie case. They have always, however, been
admissible to6 impeach-to tear down the other side's witnesses and
thus its case. 1
Under a 1984 statute, however, prior inconsistent statements of
witnesses can be used for substantive purposes in criminal cases if
64. 150 I1.App. 3d 750, 502 N.E.2d 85 (1986).
65. People v. Arteman, 150 11.App. 3d 750, 754, 502 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1986).
In People v. Rogers, 81 111. 2d 591, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980), the Illinois Supreme

Court held that, if a witness makes an in court identification, evidence that the
witness also made an out of court identification of the same person is admissible to

corroborate the in court identification.
66. 163 111. App. 3d 991, 516 N.E.2d 1322 (1988).
App. 3d 991, 995, 516 N.E.2d 1322, 1325
67. People v. Robinson, 163 I11.

(1988).
68. See People v. Collins, 49 11.2d 179, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971) (where State's

principal witness disavowed earlier out of court statements linking defendants to the
murder, it was reversible error for the court to allow the jury to consider the extensive
signed prior inconsistent statements of witness as substantive evidence).
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they meet certain specified criteria. According to section 115-10.1 of
chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes, a prior inconsistent statement of
a witness cannot be excluded as hearsay if:
(a) the statement is inconsistent with [the witness'] testimony
at the hearing or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and
(c) the statement(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition
of which the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or
signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making
of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial
in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is
being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately
recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other
similar electronic means of sound recording. 69
Thus, the principal requirements for substantive use of a prior
inconsistent statement in a criminal trial are that the witness be subject
to cross-examination at trial concerning the statement and that the
statement be either: 1) a statement "made under oath at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding ' 70 (for example, grand jury or preliminary hearing testimony), or 2) a statement based on personal knowledge that describes a relevant event or condition and that has either
been (a) written or signed by the witness, (b) acknowledged under
oath by the witness at the trial or an earlier proceeding, or (c) proved
to have been accurately recorded electronically. 71
An example of the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
can be seen in People v. O'Neal.72 In this unlawful possession of
narcotics case, the State's witness "turned around" on the State and
denied making statements to the defendant offering to cut the defendant in on the deal and denied seeing the defendant roll a marijuana
69.
70.
71.
72.
I11.
App.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1(c)(1) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1(c)(2) (1987).
139 I1.App. 3d 791, 488 N.E.2d 277 (1985), aff'd on other grounds, 148
3d 87, 499 N.E.2d 83 (1986).
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cigarette. He did, however, admit under oath that he had made untrue
statements to that effect to the police officers prior to trial. His prior
statements were therefore admissible as substantive evidence to prove
that the things he described in his prior statements did happen.,'
Moreover, in People v. Wilson, 74 the defendant's conviction for
attempted murder was reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel
when counsel's lack of awareness of the Statute allowing substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements precluded the jury from consid75
ering certain preliminary hearing testimony as substantive evidence.
Another example of the substantive use of prior inconsistent76
statements with a reluctant witness is found in People v. Hastings.
There a witness at trial denied being an eyewitness; however, he had
given three prior out of court statements to detectives indicating he
had been an eyewitness, giving some details of the occurrence in each
account. The trial court allowed the State to use one of the statements
substantively because the witness acknowledged under oath making
it, the events described were based on personal knowledge, the statement was inconsistent, and the witness was subject to cross-examination. However, the State could only use the other two prior statements
to impeach its own witness because the witness had not admitted
making them under oath and they were not signed by the witness or
electronically recorded.
The appellate court, in affirming, commented on several of the
requirements of the Statute. As for inconsistency, the court stated,
"The definition of inconsistency does not require a direct contradiction, but only a tendency to contradict the witness' present testimony." 7 7 The witness' statement at trial that he had not been an
eyewitness was clearly inconsistent with his prior statement that he
had seen the events in question. As for personal knowledge, the court
noted, "To be within the personal knowledge of a witness, the witness
must have observed, and not merely heard, the subject matter underlying the statement. "78 Because the witness' statements concerned his

73. See People v. O'Neal, 139 11. App. 3d 791, 794-95, 488 N.E.2d 277, 279
(1985), aff'd on other grounds, 148 Ill. App. 3d 87, 499 N.E.2d 83 (1986).
74. 149 Il. App. 3d 1075, 501 N.E.2d 863 (1986), appeal denied, 114 Il1. 2d
556, 508 N.E.2d 735 (1987).
75. See People v. Wilson, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1078-79, 501 N.E.2d 863, 865

(1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 556, 508 N.E.2d 735 (1987).
76. 161 Ill. App. 3d 714, 720, 515 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1987), appeal denied, 118
Ill. 2d 547, 520 N.E.2d 389 (1988).
77. Id. at 719, 515 N.E.2d at 264.
78. Id. at 720, 515 N.E.2d at 264.
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observations of events at the time of the occurrence, there was no
problem with satisfying this requirement.
1. Can an Inconsistent Statement About an Admission be Used as
Substantive Evidence?
The court's observation in People v. Hastings9 that, to be used
substantively, a witness' out of court statement must be based on first
hand knowledge, not something he "merely heard," seems to clearly
and concisely restate the personal knowledge requirement of the
Statute. However, it does not answer the question of what is to
happen when what the witness observes is a damaging out of court
statement by a party-which statement itself is admissible as an
admission. The "event" in such a case is something the witness
"merely heard," but what is heard would independently be admissible
under the admission exception to the hearsay rule.
This question arose in People v. Coleman0 where the court held
that two witnesses' prior inconsistent statements about a defendant's
admission could not be used substantively because the Statute requires
that the witnesses have personal knowledge of the underlying event
that the defendant admitted to, not just the admission. The witnesses
had said prior to trial that they were present when the defendant
made incriminating statements about the murder and robbery at issue.
At trial the witnesses acknowledged the written statements as their
own, but would not confirm their accuracy. In concluding that the
trial court had erroneously allowed such inconsistent statements to be
used substantively, the Coleman court rejected the State's argument
that the "admission" was itself "an event or condition of which the
witness had personal knowledge." 8' In support of its conclusion, the
court relied in part on Hastings, stating, "In.Hastings, the court
adopted the definition asserted by defendant, that personal knowledge
means more than being present when defendant makes incriminating
statements. The witness must have personally observed the subject
matter of his statement.1 8 2 Hastings, however, did not involve an
inconsistent statement about an admission and does not address

79. 161 Ill. App. 3d 714, 515 N.E.2d 260 (1987), appeal denied, 118 Ill. 2d
547, 520 N.E.2d 389 (1988).
80. 187 Ill. App. 3d 541, 543 N.E.2d 555 (1989), appeal denied, 129 Il. 2d
567, 550 N.E.2d 560 (1990).
81. People v. Coleman, 187 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548, 543 N.E.2d 555, 560 (1989),
appeal denied, 129 Il1. 2d 567, 550 N.E.2d 560 (1990).
82. Id. at 547, 543 N.E.2d at 559.
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whether knowledge of an out of court statement independently admissible can be knowledge of an "event."
The court further relied on a legislative discussion had just prior
to the final vote on section 115-10.1 in which one legislator (Representative Cullerton) who was "anxious that the legislative history be
complete . . . read into the record a portion" 3 of a law review article
urging that prior inconsistent statements about admissions not be used
substantively if the statements are not based on personal knowledge
of the underlying event.8 4 Because the "motivating force for Justice
Steigmann and the legislators who sponsored the bill was an article
written by"8 5 Professor Michael Graham, 6 the court considered the
author's comments as adopted by Representative Cullerton to be

persuasive .7
The Coleman court further relied for its conclusion on an article
written by Justice Robert Steigmann,88 widely regarded as the principal
author of section 115-10.1, in which the author specifically addressed
this issue and concluded that prior inconsistent statements about
admissions should not be used substantively unless the witness has
personal knowledge of the underlying event that was admitted to in
the statement.
. Thus, although the plain meaning of the text suggests an admission can be an "event," and the legislative history cited in Coleman
is at least ambiguous, those who have thought about this Statute the
most and were involved in its drafting believe that it should not and
does not allow prior inconsistent statements about admissions to be
83. Id. at 548, 543 N.E.2d at 560.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See Graham, Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive
Evidence: A CriticalReview and ProposedAmendments of FederalRules of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 MicH. L. Rnv. 1565, 1587-88 (1977).
87. A problem with citing the comments of the one legislator as proving the
intent of the whole body is that the other legislators' silence may indicate only an
intent to get to a vote on a matter and avoid a discussion. In fact, when Representative
Cullerton stated his view that the legislative intent was that inconsistent statements
about admissions should not be used substantively if there was not also personal
knowledge of the underlying crime, he then asked another legislator, Representative
McCracken, "Is that your understanding of our intent with respect to this Bill?"
Representative McCracken replied, "I know I'm supposed to say yes, but I'll be
candid. I did not think that was the limitation on it." Illinois Debates on S.B. 619,
83d Gen. Assembly (statements of Rep. Cullerton and Rep. McCracken (Nov. 1,
1983)) (available on microfiche #111 at 37).
88. Steigmann, Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence in Illinois, 72 ILL. B.J. 638, 640-41 (1984).
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used substantively unless the witness has personal knowledge of the
underlying event admitted to in the statement. It therefore seems that
the Coleman court was correct in its interpretation of the Statute. 9
A consequence of taking the Coleman position is that "(c)(2)"
statements (115-10.1(c)(2): inconsistent statements not made under
oath at trial hearing or other proceeding) must be based on personal
knowledge but that "(c)(1)" statements (1 15-10.1(c)(1): inconsistent
statements made at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding) need not be
made on personal knowledge. The Steigmann article and the Coleman
court acknowledge this result.9 The Coleman court, moreover, used
this very distinction to uphold the conviction before it. 91 It noted that
although the inconsistent statements could not be used substantively
under (c)(2) because they were not based on personal knowledge of
the underlying event, they could be used substantively under (c)(1)
because the statements had been acknowledged and confirmed under
oath before a grand jury. It therefore affirmed the conviction based
on the use of those statements.
The Coleman court noted, however, that in order for the prior
inconsistent statement about an admission to be used substantively
under (c)(1), the witness must not only admit making the statement
under oath but must also confirm its truth under oath. A mere
acknowledgement by the witness under oath that he had made the
inconsistent statement about the defendant's making an admission
would not be enough to allow it to be used substantively. 9 Thus,

89. The reasons given for not allowing an inconsistent statement about an
admission to come in unless based on knowledge of the underlying event include the
devastating effect of such an alleged admission, the ease of fabrication, and the
possibility that interrogation through leading questioning by authorities could put
conclusory words into the mouth of the witness that exaggerate or distort what the
witness knows and is willing to swear to in court. See Steigmann, supra note 88, at
640-41; Graham, supra note 86, at 1587-88.
90. See Steigman, supra note 89, at 641; People v. Coleman, 187 Ill. App. 3d
540, 548-549, 543 N.E.2d 555, 560 (1989). Stating that (c)(l) inconsistent statements
(those made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding) need not be based
on personal knowledge to the same extent as (c)(2) inconsisent statements, does not
mean that (c)(1) statements can be based on hearsay. It means only that (c)(l)
statements can be based on out of court statements that qualify as exceptions to the
hearsay rule; for example the "admissions" referred to in the grand jury testimony
in Coleman.
91. See Coleman, 187 Il. App. 3d at 548-49, 551, 543 N.E.2d at 560-61.
92. In this case, the prosecutor read the witnesses' statements to the grand jury
and carefully questioned the witnesses [before the grand jury] regarding the
authenticity and the accuracy of the statements. We find this sufficient to
qualify the statements as (c)(1) statements and make them admissible as
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although a (c)(1) inconsistent statement about an admission need not
be based on personal knowledge of the underlying event, the witness
must affirm under oath that he did hear the admission-he must
affirm that the statement about the admission is true.
2.

PriorCase Law

This Statute would apparently overturn the result in People v.
Collins3 and allow the substantive use of the type of long and detailed
pre-trial inconsistent statement signed by the witness in that case. In
Collins, it was held error to put the many pages of inconsistent
statements before the jury under the guise of the State's impeaching
a court's witness. Under the Statute, such a statement can be used as
substantive evidence. However, it should be noted that, although such
an inconsistent statement would be clearly admissible as substantive
evidence if the witness is in court and subject to cross-examination,
it is not clear that such a statement alone would be sufficient to make
a prima facie case against the defendant.9 4
3.

Constitutionality of Section 115-10.1

Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not, as of yet, held this
Statute constitutional, there are indications that it will likely uphold

substantive prior inconsistent statements. In so finding we emphasize that
the facts now before us bring the case under (c)(l) because the witness
'under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding' . . . not only admitted
to having made a previous statement, but verified its accuracy, whereas
subsection (c)(2)(B) would have applied if the witness at the grand jury
acknowledged having made such a statement but had not verified its
accuracy....
Coleman, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 543 N.E.2d at 560-61. Note, if (c)(2) applies, the
personal knowledge element is applicable; if the personal knowledge of the witness
is only of the making of the admission, and not of the underlying event, such an
inconsistent statement cannot be used substantively.
93. 49 Ill. 2d 179, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971) (where State's principal witness
disavowed earlier out of court statements linking defendants to the murder, it was
reversible error for the court to allow the jury to consider the extensive, signed, prior
inconsistent statements of witness as substantive evidence).
94. See, e.g., People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1960) (Prior identification and admission of one defendant sufficient to support
conviction for burglary. Prior identification alone not sufficient to support the
conviction of second defendant. In this case, the victim could not make an in court
identification so the prior identifications were also inconsistent statements used
substantively. What she said prior to trial was stronger than what she said at the
trial.).
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it. In People v. Orange,9 although the defendant did not challenge
the constitutionality of section 115-10.1 at trial and so the argument
was considered waived, the court stated in dicta that "the defendant's
argument must fail, for the statute was clearly within the legislature's
authority. ' 96 It further added that the fact that "this court has
previously refused to allow the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements did not preclude the legislature from doing so." 9
Several appellate decisions have found the Statute constitutional.
In People v. Edwards," the court found that the legislature had not
unconstitutionally infringed on the judiciary's inherent power to
determine the manner in which evidence is to be considered and the
trial to be conducted. "[S]ubstantive use of prior inconsistent statements of two of defendant's friends who had personal knowledge of
the events related in their statements, who were shown to have signed
those statements, and who were subject to cross-examination at
trial," 99 was held a proper use of the Statute. And in People v.
Hastings,'°° the court held that section 115-10.1 did not conflict with
the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 238 allowing impeachment of
one's own witness and therefore the Statute was not an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers. The court
also denied the defendant's contention that the Statute violated his
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses at trial, noting that the
United States Supreme Court had already held in California v.
Green, 0 1 that using a witness' prior inconsistent statement substantively does not violate the confrontation clause if the witness testifies
and is subject to cross-examination.
4.

The Sixth Amendment and the Forgetful or Mute Witness
In connection with the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements, a number of cases have recently considered what should

95. 121 Il. 2d 364, 382, 521 N.E.2d 69, 77 (1988).
96. People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 381-82, 521 N.E.2d 69, 77 (1988).
97. Id. at 381, 521 N.E.2d at 77 (citation omitted) (referring to People v.
Collins, 49 Ill. 2d 179, 274 N.E.2d 77 (1971)).
98. 167 Il. App. 3d 324, 521 N.E.2d 185 (1988).
99. People v. Edwards, 167 111. App. 3d 324, 336, 521 N.E.2d 185, 194 (1988).
See also People v. Redd, 135 Ill.
2d 252, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990). The court held that
it was a denial of a defendant's right to effective cross-examination to allow a
witness' prior inconsistent grand jury testimony to be used as substantive evidence
under section 115-10.1 when the turncoat witness took the fifth amendment at trial
and "refused to answer any questions put to him by either the prosecution or the
defense." Redd, 135 Ill.
2d at 306, 553 N.E.2d at 340. The constitutionality of
section 115-10.1 was apparently assumed and not even raised on this appeal.
100. 161 Ill.
App. 3d 714, 515 N.E.2d 260 (1987).

101. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 182 1989-1990

i990:1591

HEARSAY IN ILLINOIS

happen when the so-called turncoat witness appears at trial and
testifies to having no personal knowledge either of making the prior
statement or the events the prior statement refers to. An Illinois
appellate court, in People v. Yarbrough,0 2 held that the prior inconsistent statement of a witness who cannot remember making it cannot
properly be used substantively because that witness is not subject to
103
effective cross-examination concerning the out of court statement.
"By claiming loss of memory at trial, [the witness] effectively made
impossible any cross-examination with respect to the truth or falsity
of the out-of-court statements." 104 The court relied heavily on Douglas
1 a case decided ten years before rule 801(d)(1)(A) of
v. Alabama,05
the Federal Rules of Evidence was adopted to allow for the substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court, in U.S. v.
Owens,' °6 confronted a similar question and came to a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Yarbrough court. In Owens, the victim
of a severe beating suffered memory impairment. The first time an
FBI agent visited him in the hospital he could remember nothing. The
second time the FBI agent visited him, he named the defendant as his
attacker and identified defendant from an array of photographs. At
trial, the victim could not identify his attacker. However, he clearly
remembered identifying defendant as his attacker during his interview
with the FBI agent.
On cross-examination, the victim admitted that he could not
remember seeing his assailant, and, though there was evidence that
he received numerous visitors in the hospital, he could not remember
any of them except the FBI agent. Defense counsel also unsuccessfully
attempted to refresh his recollection with a hospital record that
indicated he had identified someone else as his attacker. 107 The trial
102. 166 I11.
App. 3d 825, 520 N.E.2d 1116 (1988).

103. See People v. Yarbrough, 166 I11.
App. 3d 825, 831, 520 N.E.2d 1116, 1120
(1988); see also-People v. Flores, 128 I11.
2d 66, 88, 538 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989)

("Contrary to the defendant's assertions, a gap in the witness' recollection concerning
the context of a prior statement does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for
effective cross-examination."). In Flores, although the witness could not remember
the underlying events upon which his prior statement was based, the prior statement
was made before a grand jury and the witness acknowledged his grand jury testimony
and confirmed its accuracy at the subsequent trial. Id.
104. Id.
105. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
106. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). The rationale of Owens was adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 89, 538 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989)
(no violation of sixth amendment right to confrontation when witness cannot remember underlying events upon which his grand jury testimony was based).
107. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988).
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court allowed the prior identification as evidence and the court of
appeals reversed.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
held that the testimony was properly admissible and that there is no
denial of a defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights "when
a witness testifies as to his current belief but is unable to recollect the
reason for that belief."'' 8 The Court went on to say that "[it is
sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such
matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his
poor eyesight and even.., the very fact that he has a bad memory." °9
As to the related question of whether the witness was subjected
to adequate "cross-examination concerning the statement" within the
meaning of the federal rule the court stated:
[L]imitations on the scope of examination by the trial court
or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the
process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination
within the intent of the rule no longer exists. But that effect
is not produced by the witness's assertion of memory losswhich, as discussed earlier, is often the very result sought to
be produced by cross-examination, and can be effective in
destroying the force of the prior statement. Rule 801(d)(1)(C),
which specifies that the cross examination need only 'concer[n]
the statement,' does not on its face require more.110
In People v. Flores,"' the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's use of a witness' inconsistent grand jury testimony when,
at trial, the witness could not remember either the events he had
testified to at the grand jury or the content of his testimony." 2 When
confronted with a transcript of the grand jury proceedings, the
immunized witness did acknowledge that it contained an accurate
description of his grand jury testimony. In ruling that there was no
error in using the inconsistent statements substantively, the court first
concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
finding that the witness' "professed loss of memory" at trial was
"inconsistent" with his testimony at the grand jury." 3 The court

108. Id. at 559.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 562.
Ill. 128 Il. 2d 66, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989).
112. See People v. Flores, 128 !11.2d 66, 88, 538 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989).
113. In interpreting the meaning of the term 'inconsistent' in Rule 801(d)(l)(A),
there are Federal decisions holding that inconsistency is not limited to direct
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further held that using this witness' inconsistent testimony did not
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses,
noting, "Contrary to the defendant's assertions, a gap in the witness'
recollection concerning the content of a prior statement does not
necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examina14
tion."1
In both Owens and Flores, the turncoat witness acknowledged at
trial making the prior statement. In both, the witness claimed no
personal knowledge of the underlying events, but the circumstantial
evidence would permit a conclusion that the declarations were probably based on personal knowledge." 5 In Yarborough, however, the
witness did not acknowledge making the prior statement. There was
less input from the witness upon which cross-examination could focus
and from which the jury could assess the reliability of the out of
court statement. The Yarborough court, without the benefit of cases
like Owens and Flores, held the inconsistent testimony of the forgetful
witness could not be used.
Whether the Yarborough holding can survive Owens and Flores
depends on whether a court will conclude that, even though the
witness does not recall making any prior statement, there are still
"realistic weapons" to test his credibility." 6 The question in a Yarborough-type situation is, at what point does cross-examining a
witness with no memory become just like cross-examining a person
who is, in fact, incompetent to testify, for example, someone who,
through injury or otherwise, has lost the ability to speak or to narrate
and recall events accurately.

contradictions but 'may be found in evasive answers ....

silence, or changes

in position.' . . . The determination of whether a witness' prior testimony
is inconsistent with his present testimony is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court.
People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 87-88, 538 N.E.2d 481, 488-89 (1989). See also
United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 608 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e do not read the
word 'inconsistent' in Rule 801(d)(l)(A) to include only statements diametrically
opposed or logically incompatible. Inconsistency 'may be found in evasive answers,
...silence, or change in positions."').
114. People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 88, 538 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989) (citing
People v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)).
115. The evidence would also support the drawing of a contrary conclusion in
Owens, i.e., the statements were not made from personal knowledge, but from the
suggestibility of the interviewer.
116. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 560. In Owens, the defendant emphasized the
witness' memory loss and argued that his prior identification was the product of
suggestibility.
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It is clear that a person who is unconscious or dead, though
subject to having leading questions hurled at him, is not subject to
"meaningful cross-examination" either under the Illinois statute or
under the sixth amendment. This is true even though, in such instance,
the cross-examiner is able to demonstrate "the very result sought to
be produced by cross examination," 11 7 that the deceased or unconscious "witness" has suffered a memory loss. One distinction between
the unconscious or deceased "witness" and the witness who can
remember neither making the prior statement nor its underlying basis
is that, at least with the witness in court claiming memory failure, the
jury can look at his demeanor in trying to decide if he is "faking" a
memory loss or whether the memory loss is something over which he
has no control. Whether this small window for cross-examining such
a witness would be enough to satisfy the sixth amendment and the
statute might depend on the extent of the memory loss and what, if
anything, is left to be subject to cross-examination.
According to Owens, even though a witness who cannot remember making a statement is considered unavailable under Federal Rule
804(a)(3), such an unavailable witness can still be "subject to crossexamination." The fact that an unavailable witness can still be subject
to cross-examination is considered "only a semantic oddity" and not
a "substantive inconsistency." 118

In considering whether meaningful cross-examination can occur
when a witness suffers a memory loss as to both making the prior
statement and its basis, two related issues should be addressed. One
is whether there can be meaningful cross-examination when the turncoat witness refuses to testify by invoking his fifth amendment
privilege as to matters relating to the prior statement. The other is
whether a witness who invokes no privilege but simply refuses to
testify at all, even in the teeth of a contempt finding, can be subject
to meaningful cross-examination.
With respect to the first issue, the Illinois Supreme Court recently
held in People v. Redd1 9 that the State could not make substantive
use of a witness' prior inconsistent testimony before a grand jury
when the witness appeared at trial, invoked his fifth amendment
privilege, and "refused to answer any questions put to him by either
the prosecution or the defense.'

'20

Under those circumstances, the

117. Id. at 562. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

118. See Owens,, 484 U.S. at 562.
119. People v. Redd, 135 Il. 2d 252, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990).
120. Id. at 306, 553 N.E.2d at 340. The court also held that the inconsistent
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witness "was not subject to effective cross-examination."" '' The court
also held that "it was error for the circuit court to construe [the
witness'] assertion of the privilege as being inconsistent with his out22
of-court statements to the grand jury."'
The court also distinguished Owens, Flores, and United States v.
Dicaro.2 1 In Dicaro, a witness' memory loss was held not to preclude
cross-examination of a witness and the substantive use of that witness'
prior inconsistent statements. The Redd court pointed out that "The
Dicaro court was careful to 'avoid a construction [of the requirement
that a witness be subject to cross-examination concerning the state' ' 24
ment] that would render the requirement effectively meaningless,"
and noted that, in Flores, the court held that a mere "gap" in the
witness' recollection "concerning the content of a prior statement"
would not necessarily preclude an "opportunity for effective cross
examination" as long as the declarant was "actually testifying as a
witness and [was] subject to full and effective cross-examination."' 1 21
On the facts before it, the Redd court held that the "[witness']
'assertions of privilege . . . undermine[d] the process to such a degree
that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the rule no
longer exist[edl' "126 and declared that the " 'mere fact' that [the
statements of the witness who claimed the privilege not to testify could not be used
to impeach that witness. "The purpose of impeaching evidence is to destroy the
credibility of a witness, not to establish the truth of the impeaching evidence ....
Since Mr. Bea did not testify, it was error to allow. him to be impeached by prior
statements allegedly made by him concerning [the] defendant ...
" Id. at 316-17,
553 N.E.2d at 345.
121. Id. at 306, 553 N.E.2d at 340.
122. Id.
The court refused to treat the assertion of a privilege the same as a memory
loss and, therefore, refused to find that the witness' silence at trial was
inconsistent with his prior testimony. 'We conclude the assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege may not be treated as a memory loss for purposes of
satisfying the requirement of inconsistency in section 115-10.1(a). When a
witness is permitted to assert the privilege not to incriminate himself, he is
not claiming to be unable to recollect prior affirmations of asserted facts.
The witness is not asserting a 'gap in [his] recollection concerning the content
of a prior statement.' . . . The witness is asserting only that he believes the
answers to questions posed may tend to incriminate him. The circuit court
erred in holding Mr. Bea's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege to be
inconsistent with his prior testimony.'
People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 308, 553 N.E.2d 316, 341 (1990).
123. 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1985).
124. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d at 309, 553 N.E.2d at 341.
125. Id. at 310, 553 N.E.2d at 342.
126. Id. at 312, 553 N.E.2d at 343 (citing People v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554
(1988)).
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witness] was present and sat 'still long enough for questions to be
put' to him simply [did] not substitute for effective cross-examination
within the meaning of subsection (b) of section 115-10.1 ... ,
In remanding the case for a new trial, the court observed that if
the witness again refuses to testify based on his fifth amendment
privilege, the trial court must make a determination as to whether
there are reasonable grounds for invoking that privilege. It then noted
that, if no reasonable grounds exist to claim the privilege or if grounds
exist and immunity is granted, "the witness should not be allowed to
refuse to testify based on the fifth amendment privilege."' 28
The Court's language suggests that the problem in the Redd case
can be solved by either properly denying a claim of privilege or
granting the witness immunity. However, if the witness refuses to
testify without claiming a privilege or even with immunity, the problem for the defendant remains. Is such a witness who refuses to take
the stand subject to effective cross examination or is he just like the
witness who refuses to testify because he properly invokes a privilege?
In United States v. Carlson,2 9 such a case arose. There a witness

refused to testify even after being granted immunity and being held
in contempt. The court concluded after a lengthy analysis that use of
the inconsistent grand jury testimony of the witness would violate the
defendant's sixth amendment rights unless the defendant could be
found to have waived those rights. On the facts before it, the court
found that the defendant did waive those rights by threatening and
scaring the witness off the stand. 30
As far as a defendant is concerned, his problem in cross-examining a witness who claims a privilege is similar to the problem in
cross-examining a witness who simply will not take the stand. If
Illinois holds that claiming a privilege renders a witness not subject
to cross-examination, it seems it would also have to hold that a
witness who simply refuses to testify at all is not subject to crossexamination within the meaning of section 115-10.1. There may be
some reluctance to do this, however, because if a witness is willing to
pay the price of a contempt sentence, he, and not the court, can
determine whether his prior statements can be used substantively
127. Redd, 135 Ill.
2d at 312, 553 N.E.2d at 343.
128. Id. at 314, 553 N.E.2d at 344.
129. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Mastrangelo, 693

F.2d 269 (2nd Cir. 1982) (grand jury testimony of a murdered witness can be used
substantively against the defendant if the defendant was involved in the death of the
witness; confrontation rights waived under such circumstances).
130. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
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against the defendant. Nonetheless, cases cited in the special concurring opinion by Justice Miller further suggest this result.",
As was noted above, there are similar problems with crossexamining a witness who asserts a lack of memory both as to the
making of prior inconsistent statements and their content. The cases
suggest that whether such witnesses can be subject to effective crossexamination about their prior statements will depend on a case by
case determination of whether "realistic weapons" exist by which the
cross-examiner can test (and the jury can come to a determination of)
the sincerity and reliability of the witness' statements.
5. Impeachment vs. Contradiction with Inconsistent Statements
In James v. Illinois,3 2 the United States Supreme Court held that
an illegally obtained incriminating statement by a defendant could not
be used under the "impeachment" exception to the exclusionary rule
to contradict a witness who had testified favorably for the defendant.
The State had, in effect, contended that the illegally obtained statement was inconsistent with the defendant's defense and therefore
33
could be used to "impeach" a favorable defense witness.'
James had been charged with murder and attempted murder. The
day after the shooting he was taken into custody and interrogated.
At the time he was picked up, he was found at his mother's beauty
parlor under a hair dryer, his hair black and curly. He told police,
however, that the day before (the day of the shooting) his hair had
been reddish-brown, long, and combed straight back. He admitted he
had gone to the beauty parlor to have his hair dyed black and to
change his appearance. These statements were later suppressed as the

131. See United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971) (requirement of
then-proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) that declarant testify at trial and be
subject to cross-examination concerning statement not satisfied when declarant makes
evident his refusal to testify); see also United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326,
1330 (lth Cir. 1989) (wife rendered unavailable as witness by assertion of spousal
privilege not to testify against husband); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548
F.2d 460, 463 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("A witness who refuses to be sworn or to testify at
all or one who, having been sworn, declines to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds,
has not been thus made available for cross-examination."). The basis of Justice
Miller's special concurrence (joined by Justice Stamos) appears to be his concern
with the majority's conclusion that a witness' invoking a fifth amendment privilege
"cannot be construed as being inconsistent with what the witness said on a prior
occasion." People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 327, 553 N.E.2d 316, 350 (1990) (Miller,
J., specially concurring).
132. 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
133. See James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 650 (1990).
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fruit of a warrantless arrest for which there was no probable cause. 3 4
At trial witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter and
stated he had long, reddish hair which he combed back. The defendant
did not testify but called a witness who testified that on the day of
the shooting defendant's hair was black. The State was then allowed
to "impeach" this witness with the illegally obtained statements of
the defendan t that his hair was reddish, The Illinois Supreme Court,
with three Justices dissenting, affirmed the use of such illegally
obtained statements on the ground that such evidence, although not
usable for substantive purposes, could be used for impeachment
purposes, and that what was done here was impeachment.'
In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held that the "impeachment" exception to the exclusionary rule' 36 would not be expanded to allow illegally obtained
statements from a defendant to be used to contradict or impeach
anyone other than the defendant. Allowing the State to use such
statements against defense witnesses other than the defendant "would
significantly weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police
misconduct,' 37 and "would vastly increase the number of occasions
on which such evidence could be used."'3 The prosecution's access
to such illegally obtained evidence would not just deter perjury by
defendant, "it would also deter defendants from calling witnesses in
the first place ....,"9Because expanding the impeachment exception
to permit the State to impeach not only the declarant/defendant but
his whole case would not, on balance, sufficiently further the truth
seeking process and "would appreciably undermine the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule , . ." the court declined to expand the
impeachment exception and allow such illegally obtained statements
to impeach someone other than the declarant." 40
Although the James case deals with an illegally obtained statement, it shows that substantive use of a statement which is admissible
only for impeachment can be prejudicial and reversible error. If a

134, See l.
135. 123 111.24 523, 528 NE,2d 723 (1988),
136, Under the exception, illegally obtained evidence can be used for impeachment purposes but not as a part of "the government's direct case, or otherwise, as
substantive evidence of guilt," James, 110 S,Ct, at 652 (quoting United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980)).
137, 110 S,Ct, 648, 654 (1990),
138, Id. at 655,
139, Id.
140. See id.at 656.
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statement is used to attack the credibility of the person who made it,
for example a self-contradiction, that is impeachment, and the statement need not fit within any hearsay exception. But, if an out of
court statement is used to contradict or rebut the testimony of
someone other than the person who made it, that is a substantive
use.' 4' To use such a statement substantively, it must either fit within
exception or some other rule authorizing its
a recognized hearsay
42
substantive use.
C. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS VS. PRIOR INCONSISTENT
IDENTIFICATIONS

Current law allows substantive use of some prior inconsistent
statements in criminal cases. However, it is not clear whether a
witness' prior identification, in the absence of an in court identification, can be used substantively. In other words, in the case of the
turncoat witness who makes a prior identification, but makes no in
court identification, the question is whether the inconsistent prior
identification can be used substantively.
Prior inconsistent statements are governed by paragraph 115-10.1
of chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes,4 3 and prior identifications are
governed by paragraph 115-12 of the same chapter. 1 " As written, the
statute allowing for the substantive use of prior identifications is silent
as to whether the prior identification must be consistent with a current
in court identification, i.e., whether it must corraborate an in court
identification. However, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Rogers,' 41 acknowledged that the federal rule (whose language is
virtually identical to 115-12) "has been construed as permitting the
141. See, e.g., People v. Manning, 185 Ill. App. 3d 597, 541 N.E.2d 797 (1981)
(Error to use pretrial statement, admissible only for impeachment, as substantive
evidence in rebuttal. State cannot use prior inconsistent statements to impeach
defendant without confronting defendant on the stand with the details of each
statement and giving him an opportunity to admit or deny making it).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 62-92.
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para, 115-10,1 (1985). See supra text accompanying
note 69 for the content of paragraph 115-10,1,
144. ILL. REV, STAT, ch, 38, para. 115-12 (1985), The text of this statute reads
as follows:

Substantive Admissibility of Prior Identification, A statement is not rendered
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing, and (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and (c) the statement is one of Identification of a person
made after perceiving him.
145. 81 111. 2d 571, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980).
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introduction of such evidence, not merely for corroboration, but as
46
substantive proof of the issue of identity."
The Rogers case allowed prior identifications only to support an
in court identification. 147 The 1984 statute can be seen as a response
to Rogers, and its language suggests that the statute would allow the
use of prior identifications even if they are inconsistent with the in
court testimony; that is, even if there is no in court identification.
This is, in fact, what was done by the United States Supreme Court
48
in United States v. Owens.
Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that
it would not allow the substantive use of prior identifications if there
has been no in court identification. In People v. Shum,149 after
acknowledging that the officer's testimony about the victim's own
prior identification did not violate the hearsay rule because of the
opportunity to cross-examine both the victim and the officer, the
court then stated, "The evidence of the out-of-court identification by
the witness and the third person should be used only in corroboration
of an in court identification and not as substantive evidence."' 50
Section 115-12, however, was not mentioned in the opinion.
The reasoning may be that, unless the inconsistent identification
qualifies under the criteria of 115-10.1-that it was signed, acknowledged under oath, recorded electronically, or made under oath at a
trial, hearing or other proceeding-it should not be used substantively.
However, if the declarant is in court and subject to cross-examination
about a prior identification he now disavows, the reason for excluding
the prior identification is not lack of opportunity for cross-examination but a concern over the reliability and sufficiency of such a
statement of identification as evidence.
In People v. Davis,5 ' the court held that a prior identification
made under oath at a preliminary hearing could not be used substantively to contradict a turn-coat witness who changed his story at trial
because the prior identification statute12 and Rogers did not permit
the use of inconsistent prior identifications. 53 And, although the prior
146. Id. at 582, 411 N.E.2d at 228.
147. See id.
148. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). For a discussion of Owens, see supra notes 106-110
and accompanying text.
149. 117 Ill. 2d 317, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (1987).
150. Id. at 342, 512 N.E.2d at 1191.
151. 137 Ill. App. 3d 769, 484 N.E.2d 1098 (1985).
152. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-12 (1985).
153. See People v. Davis, 137 IIl. 2d 769, 770-72, 484 N.E.2d 1098, 1099-1100
(1985).
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identification would have qualified under the prior inconsistent statement statute, that paragraph had not been in effect at the time of the
defendant's trial. 5 4 Defendant's conviction was, therefore, reversed.
However, the language of 115-12 pertaining to prior identifications
would seem to allow them regardless of whether they are consistent
or inconsistent with in court testimony and regardless of whether
section 115-10.1 had ever been enacted. The doubt about whether
inconsistent prior identifications can be used substantively comes not
so much from the Section's language as from language in Illinois
6
Supreme Court cases such as Shum'" and Rogers. 1 In any event,
even if prior inconsistent identifications are admissible, the question
still remains whether they alone will be sufficient to make a prima
facie case. 5 '
V.
A.

ADMISSIONS

DEFINITION

Anything a party has ever said or done that is contrary to what
that party is now contending at trial' is admissible against that party
as an admission (assuming that such statements or acts are also
competent and relevant). 5 9 In criminal cases, admissions are sometimes defined as anything said or done by a defendant from which
guilt of the criminal charges may be inferred.' 6°
Admissions can also be made by the State in criminal cases;
however, to be an admission, a statement has to be made by someone
authorized to speak on the State's behalf about the case. Statements
154. See id. at 771-72, 484 N.E.2d at 1100.

155. 117 I11.2d 317, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (1987).
156. 81 111. 2d 571, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980).
157. See supra note 94.
158. See Goad v. Evans, 191 111. App. 3d 283, 547 N.E.2d 690, 703 (1989)
("Statements by parties which are contrary to their positions at trial are admissions,
which are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule."). If the party's out of
court statements are helpful to his or her case, they are not ordinarily admissible in
that party's favor because they would be prior consistent statements. See People v.
Andino, 99 I11.App. 3d 952, 425 N.E.2d 1333 (1981).
159. See Breslin v. Bates, 14 I11.App. 3d 941, 303 N.E.2d 807 (1973); Haskell
v. Siegmund, 28 I1l. App. 2d .1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (1960); Casey v. Burns, 7 I11.App.
2d 316, 323, 129 N.E.2d 440, 444 (1955).
160. See People v. George, 38 I11. 2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851, 858 (1967) (An
"admission is any statement or conduct from which guilt of the crime may be inferred
but from which guilt does not necessarily follow."). Id. (quoting People v. Stanton,
16 I11. 2d 459, 466, 158 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1959)).
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made by victims are not admissions against the State because the
6
victims are not parties.1 '
1. Requirements for an Admission
Only parties to the lawsuit or criminal case can make admissions.
A "damaging statement" by a non-party (a statement hurtful to the
non-party), though not an admission, may be admissible as a "declaration against interest" if the declarant is "unavailable" and the
other requirements for that exception are met.162
To qualify as an admission, a statement need not be against the
party's interest when made; it need only turn out to be against the
party's interest at the time of trial. 63 Statements or acts that were
"innocent" when made by a party can turn out to be admissions at
trial if they are now contrary to what that party is contending at trial
or if they are something from which guilt of a crime may be inferred.
For example, in People v. Veal,'6 a defendant's statement to an
officer that he owned a rifle but that it did not work properly was
held admissible as an admission even though the statement had been
made more than two weeks prior to the shooting with which the
defendant was charged. 65 Also, in Dari v. Uniroyal, 66 it was held
error, though harmless, to exclude an out of court admission made
by an insured some sixteen months before the insured became a party
167
by filing suit.
The basis for admitting admissions is found in the assumption
that a party said to have made an admission will, in all likelihood,
be present at trial and can, through himself or other witnesses, deny
making the admission, attempt to explain it away, or contradict the
substance of it. 6s The admissibility is not founded on the notion that
a party does not ordinarily make statements damaging to himself
unless they are true. That is the basis for admitting declarations

161. However, such statements can be used to impeach the victim if he or she
testifies and the testimony is inconsistent with the statements.
162. See Buckley v. Cronkite, 74 Ill. App. 3d 487, 393 N.E.2d 60 (1979); see
also text accompanying notes 258-268.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 163-164.
164. 58 I1. App. 3d 938, 374 N.E.2d 963 (1978).
165. See People v. Veal, 58 Il1. App. 3d 938, 966, 374 N.E.2d 963, 983 (1978).
166. 41 Ill. App. 3d 122, 353 N.E.2d 298 (1976).
1.67. See Dari v. Uniroyal, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 122, 126-27, 353 N.E.2d 298,
303 (1976).
168. See Hendricks v. Bettner, 40 I1. App. 3d 1038, 353 N.E.2d 83 (1976).
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against interest made by non-party, unavailable declarants.1 69 Admissions come in as a consequence of the principle of the adversary
system that allows anything one ever says or does to be used against
him. 170
It is because admissions have no particular guarantee of trustWorthiness that the Federal Rules of Evidence characterize them as
"non-hearsay" under rule 801(d)(2).171 Illinois courts allow admissions
to be used as substantive evidence" 2 and are apparently not concerned
about whether they are hearsay or non-hearsay.
An admission need not be based on the personal knowledge of
the party making it; the party need only endorse or adopt a view in
an act or statement contrary to what he is later contending at trial to
have such act or statement admissible against him. In Casey v.
Burns," 3 for example, a dram shop case, a police officer testified that
the tavern owner said he had not been present at the time of the

169. See Buckley v. Cronkite, 74 Ill. App. 3d 487, 393 N.E.2d 60 (1979). For a
discussion of declarations against interest see section VII of this article.
170. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). However, a coconspirator's declaration implicating a defendant cannot be admitted unless the
defendant has been connected to the conspiracy in the opinion of the trial judge by
a preponderance of evidence. In. determining whether the target defendant has been
connected to the conspiracy by a preponderance of evidence, the trial judge may
consider as evidence the very hearsay declaration seeking admission. This follows
from federal rule 104(a) which allows a court to consider inadmissible evidence in
making preliminary findings of fact (e.g., connection to the conspiracy) upon which
admissibility turns. See dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall):
Thus, unlike many common-law hearsay exceptions, the co-conspirator
exemption from hearsay with its agency rationale was not based primarily
upon any particular guarantees of reliability or trustworthiness that were
intended to ensure the truthfulness of the admitted statement and to
compensate for the fact that a party would not have the opportunity to test
As such, this exemption
its veracity by cross-examining the declarant ....
was considered to be a 'vicarious admission.' . . ."As with all admissions,

an 'adversary system,' rather than a reliability, rationale was used to account
for the exemption to the ban on hearsay: it was thought that a party could
not complain of the deprivation of the right to cross-examine himself (or
another authorized to speak for him) or to advocate his own, or his agent's,
untrustworthiness.
Id. at 190 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (referring to C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 262 at 775 (E. Cleary ed. 1984)).
171. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note (admission by party
opponent):
172. See supra notes 161-162, 175 and accompanying text.
173. 7 111. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440 (1955).
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incident, but knew that his bartender had hit the patron with a
blackjack. The statement of the owner was properly held admissible
174
as an admission.
An admission is admissible as substantive evidence, and no
warning of the type required before one can impeach a witness with
a contrary statement1 75 is necessary before introducing evidence of an
admission. In the case of a written statement signed by a party, the
statement must be authenticated as the party's statement before it can
be used as an admission against that party.17 6 In some cases, a bare
signature may not be a sufficient foundation. A good example of the
kind of authentication problems that can arise with written admissions
is found in Laughlin v. Chenoweth. 177 There, defense counsel confronted the ten-year old plaintiff with a damaging statement signed
by him and his mother, of which plaintiff denied any recollection.
No further foundation was introduced. The court held that there was
no error in the trial court excluding the statement:
Had it been shown that the minor had read the statement
prior to signing, that would have been sufficient to require its
admission. Similarly, had his mother testified to having read
the statement and stated that it accurately portrayed what her
son had said, admission of the document would have been
required. However, a trial judge has discretion in determining
whether a sufficient showing of the accuracy of evidence has
78
been made before allowing its admission. 1
A damaging statement by a party in his discovery deposition that
amounts to an admission is admissible against that party under Illinois
79
Supreme Court Rule 212.1

174. See id. at 325, 129 N.E.2d at 445.
175. See, e.g., Security Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner of Savings &

Loan, 77 I11.App. 3d 606, 396 N.E.2d 320 (1979) (plaintiff should have been allowed
to introduce admissions the defendant's president made in his discovery deposition
without having to call the president as a witness and confront him with the

admissions).
176. See Laughlin v. Chenoweth, 92 I11.App. 3d 430, 414 N.E.2d 1296 (1980).
177. 92 I11.App. 3d 430, 414 N.E.2d 1296 (1980).
178. Id. at 435, 414 N.E.2d at 1300.
179. See id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 212 (1987). Rule 212
provides that a discovery deposition "may be used ... (2) as an admission made by
a party or by an officer or agent of a party in the same manner and to the same
extent as any other admission by that person .... "
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B. VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS; EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO SPEAK ON
BEHALF OF EMPLOYER

The law on vicarious admissions is clearly stated by Taylor v.
Checker Cab Company:11° if a damaging out of court statement is
made by an employee expressly authorized to make such a statement
on behalf of the employer, the employee's damaging statement is
admissible against the employer as a vicarious admission. The damaging statement can also be admissible if it is later ratified by the
employer.' 8
1. Implied Authority to Speak
If there is no ratification, and if the employee has not been
expressly authorized to speak about that matter on behalf of his
employer, then there must be implied authority to speak on behalf of
the employer before such employee's out of court statement can be
used as an admission against the employer. For authority to be
implied: (1) it must be implied from the nature of the employee's
duties; (2) the statement must be about a matter within the scope of
the employee's duties; and (3) the statement must have been made
while the employee was engaged in performing his duties.,8"
In Taylor v. Checker Cab Co.,83 a post-accident statement by a
cab driver was held not impliedly authorized and was furthermore
made after the driver had ceased being an employee. The statement
was therefore inadmissible against the employer.
2.

No Express or Implied Authority to Speak

Under Illinois law then, most damaging post-accident statements
by ordinary employees, such as truck drivers, laborers, and others
not expressly authorized to speak, will not be admissible against their
employers as admissions because such employees are not authorized
to speak and the nature of their duties will not often carry implied
authority to speak. For example, in Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft,84 a
guest brought suit against a hotel. The court held there was no error
in precluding a witness from testifying to a damaging out of court

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

34 I11.App. 3d 413, 339 N.E.2d 769 (1975).
See id. at 419, 339 N.E.2d at 775.
See id.
Id.
5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955).
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statement by a hotel clerk that he had let two men into plaintiff's
hotel room on the night in question. 8 '
Thus, damaging statements by employees who are at home, or
"off duty," or in discovery depositions,8 6 ordinarily will not be
admissible against their employers as vicarious admissions. However,
they may be admissible if they qualify as declarations against interest
or excited utterances or some other hearsay exception. Of course, if
such employees testify in court, they can properly testify to anything
within their personal knowledge.
A case which retains the requirement that damaging statements
must be expressly or impliedly authorized to be admissible against an
employer, but, nonetheless, finds authority to speak implied by the
nature of the job, is Cornell v. Langland.8 7 There, an out of court
post-accident statement by the managing golf pro at defendant's club
to plaintiff's husband that the hole was shorter than the 315 yards
marked, was held admissible as an admission against the club in an
action to recover for injuries suffered when plaintiff was hit by
another golfer's drive. Because the golf pro was the "overseer" of
the course, he was found to have had implied authority to speak with
patrons concerning the problems about the course.'8 8
In keeping with Illinois' requirement of implied authority, a
statement about the actual length of a hole, made by a caddy at a
golf club to a golfing patron prior to the accident, would probably
be admissible given the likelihood of implied authority to speak to
the golfers. However, that same statement made after an incident, in
response to a question about the accident, or off the club premises,
would not likely qualify as a vicarious admission under Taylor.8 9
There would be no implied authority to speak on behalf of the club
under such circumstances and the speaker would not be engaged in
the performance of his duties for the employer at that time.

185. See Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill. App. 2d. 327, 332-33, 125 N.E.2d.
544, 547 (1955).

186. Generally, a statement made while an employee is "off duty" or in a
deposition will not be expressly authorized. Though some executives may be expected
to be on duty 24 hours a day and thus have implied or express authority during that
time, even they, however, would probably not be considered to have implied authority
to speak for the employer while being deposed and, further, any arguable authority
to speak for the employer in the deposition might have been expressly withdrawn.
187. 109 11. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985 (1982).
188. See Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d. 472, 476, 440 N.E.2d. 985, 988
(1982).
189. See id.

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 198 1989-1990

1990:159]

HEARSAY IN ILLINOIS

That ordinary damaging statements by employees are not admissible as admissions against employers in Illinois is further illustrated
by the recent case of Waechter v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.190 In
Waechter, the plaintiff was injured when an escalator suddenly stopped.
Immediately after her fall, the plaintiff walked over to the customer
service counter and reported the incident to an unidentified woman
behind the counter. According to the plaintiff, the unidentified employee responded, "Oh no, not again. The escalator repairman has
been out here I don't know how many times in the past two weeks."' 91
This out of court statement was held inadmissible and found not to
92
qualify as an admission against the employer.
The plaintiff in Waechter, apparently aware of Illinois law, did
not attempt to offer this out of court statement as an admission (to
prove the truth of the matter asserted) against Carson's. Instead, the
plaintiff argued that the statement was admissible as circumstantial
evidence that defendant Carson's had received notice of the escalator's
dangerous condition prior to the accident. This contention was properly rejected by the court. 93 For the out of court statement ("The
repair man has been out here many times in the past two weeks") to
count as notice to the employer, it would have to be accepted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted ("I saw the man out here many
times"). It would therefore have to count as a vicarious admission to
be admissible.
Even if the employee's statement had been "my boss told me
this is the second time the repairman has been here this week," such
a statement still would not be admissible against the employer unless
the employee was shown to have implied authority to make such a
damaging acknowledgement. Under Illinois law, an employee's postaccident statements must spring from either express authority or
authority to speak implied from the nature of the job in order for
them to count as admissions against the employer.194 No such authority
was shown in Waechter.

2d 595, 530
190. 170 I1. App. 3d 370, 523 N.E.2d 1348, appeal denied, 122 Ill.
N.E.2d 266 (1988).
191. Waechter v. Carson Pirie Scott and Co., 170 Il1. App. 3d 370, 372, 523
2d 595, 530 N.E.2d 266 (1988).
N.E.2d 1348, 1348, appeal denied, 122 Ill.
192. See id.at 372, 523 N.E.2d at 1348.
193. See id.at 373, 523 N.E.2d at 1349.
194. See Waechter v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 170 Ill. App. 3d 370, 523
2d 595, 530 N.E.2d 266 (1988); Cornell v.
N.E.2d 1348, appeal denied, 122 Ill.
Langland, 109 Il.App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985 (1982); Taylor v. Checker Cab Co.,
34 Ill. App. 3d 413, 339 N.E.2d 769(1975).
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Even if such a statement were offered to prove the "present
mental state" of the employee ("I know the escalator man was here"),
that expressed mental state would not be admissible against the
employer as an admission. It would be an "unauthorized" damaging
statement that would not qualify as a vicarious admission of the
employer. If the plaintiff could have produced the employee in court,
that employee could have testified to what she observed, just like any
other witness. But if the plaintiff wishes to rely on the witness' out
of court statement to prove its truth, or use it against the employer,
under Illinois law, the statement must be based on express or implied
authority.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an out of court statement
by an employee needs no authorization, express or implied, to be
admissible against the employer as an admission. 95 To be admissible,
the statement need only be made by an agent or servant and concern
"a matter within the scope of [his] agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship .... ,196 The treatment of the
admissibility of an employee's damaging statements represents one of
the most important differences between Illinois evidence law and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Illinois, apparently because of the difficulty in defending against "alleged" vicarious admissions, gives employers more protection from such admissions than does Federal Rule
97
801 (d)(2)(D).'
C.

CO-CONSPIRATOR'S DECLARATIONS

Illinois law recognizes the co-conspirator's statement exception
to the hearsay rule which permits declarations made "in furtherance
of and during the pendency of the conspiracy to be admitted not only
against the declarant, but also his co-conspirators upon an independent, prima facie showing of a conspiracy."'' 98 In order for a coconspirator's declaration to qualify as an admission, a party must
show that the declaration was made in furtherance of the conspiracy
and must establish a prima facie case of conspiracy against the person
who will be implicated by the declaration. 99
In People v. Parmly,2°° a murder case, the State's accomplice
witness testified that another conspirator, Foutch, told him after the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

FED. R. EvrD. 801(d)(2)(D).

Id.
Id.
People v. Goodman, 81 111. 2d 278, 283, 408 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1980).
See id.
117 I11.2d 386, 512 N.E.2d 1213 (1987).

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 200 1989-1990

1990:1591

HEARSAY IN ILLINOIS

incident that he (Foutch) and the defendant had shot the victim but
that the defendant had fired the shot that killed the victim. Because
declarant Foutch's statements were made after the principal object of
the conspiracy was completed, the State sought to admit the statements
"as furthering a subordinate conspiracy or an extension of the conspiracy to conceal the . . . [offense]." ' 20 The supreme court held that,
"[a]ssuming . . . the co-conspirator exception does include so-called
'concealment phase' statements, ' 20 2 these statements did not come
within the exception because they had not been made "in furtherance
of any effort at concealment. ' 20 3 The convictions were therefore
reversed for admission of improper hearsay.
Chief Justice Clark did not join in the majority opinion because
the "novel" determination that the declarant's statement was not in
furtherance of an effort at concealment "finds no support in the 'case
24
law and rests wholly upon a foundation riddled with conjecture. " 0
D.

ADMISSIONS BY SILENCE AND ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS

Where an accusatory statement is made in the presence and
hearing of a party, and the court concludes that a reasonable person
would deny those statements if not true, and such statements are not
denied, they are considered to be an admission by the target, with the
result that such accusations may be accepted by the jury as true. In
People v. Morgan,2 5 an equivocal response to an incriminating accusation was considered the equivalent of silence because it did not

201. People v. Parmly, 117 Ill. 2d 386, 393, 512 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (1987).
202. Id. at 393, 512 N.E.2d at 1216.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 396-97, 512 N.E.2d at 1218 (Clark, C.J. concurring). Justice Clark
did, however, join in the judgment of the court because of his belief that the trial
judge abused his discretion "in refusing to excuse a juror notwithstanding substantial
evidence that the juror was a friend of [the victim] and had been less than candid on
voir dire in revealing the true nature of their relationship." Id. at 397, 512 N.E.2d
at 1218 (Clark, C.J. concurring).
205. 44 Ill. App. 3d 459, 358 N.E.2d 280 (1977), cert. denied, 122 Ill. 2d 587,
530 N.E.2d 257 (1988). In Morgan, the court affirmed a conviction for burglary and
arson on the strength of both an "adoptive admission" and defendant's fingerprint
found at the scene. When a friend of the defendant asked him, in the presence of
his brother and other friends, why he burned the cleaners down, he replied, "How
do you know I did it?" When the friend replied, "Your brother told me," and the
brother then told Virgil Morgan he might as well own up to it because the accuser
knew it, the defendant "just sort of laughed and shrugged it off." Id. at 462, 358
N.E.2d at 283.
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amount to a denial or a clear statement of non-acquiescence where
such was called for. 2°
The key to admissibility of an adoptive admission is not just
whether the statement was made in the presence of the party and
directed to that party, but whether, in the opinion of the trial judge,
circumstances were such that a reasonable person would have denied
the statement if it were untrue. The focus then is on the circumstances
20 7
in which the accusation is made.
Such adoptive admissions are also recognized in civil cases. See,
for example, Breslin v. Bates,2°8 where, in affirming a judgment
against an automobile driver, the court found that the driver's failure
to deny her excessive speed when confronted by her companion's
accusations constituted an adoptive admission. The driver did not
remain silent, but made an equivocal remark that did not amount to
a denial.2 09
E.

EVIDENTIARY VS. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

Ordinary damaging statements made by a party are considered
"evidentiary" admissions. The party against whom they are used can
deny them or introduce evidence to contradict their substance. The
trier of fact, as with other evidence, can accept them or not. Judicial
admissions, however, once made, estop a party with respect to the
matter admitted. Once made, they cannot be taken back or contradicted. They remove an issue from the trier of fact.
Judicial admissions are damaging statements made by a party
under formal judicial circumstances. 210 The most typical example is
an admission in a live pleading that has not been amended or
superseded. 21 Other examples include testimony by a party at trial
and statements made in court under formal circumstances by a party's
lawyers. In addition, statements made by a party in a discovery
deposition, if they are clear and unequivocal212 statements of fact

206. See People v. Morgan, 44 Ill. App. 3d 459, 462-64, 358 N.E.2d 280, 28283 (1977), cert. denied, 122 Ill. 2d 587, 530 N.E.2d 257 (1988).
207. See id.
208. 14 Ill. App. 3d 941, 303 N.E.2d 807 (1973).
209. See Breslin v. Bates, 14 I1. App. 3d. 941, 947, 303 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1973).
210. See Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
71 111. App. 3d 562, 390 N.E.2d 60 (1979).
211. See Colt Constr. and Dev. Co. v. North, 168 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916, 523
N.E.2d 90, 92 (1988).
212. See Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480, 508 N.E.2d
301, 304 (1987); see also Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 164 Ill. App. 3d 884, 518
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about a matter peculiarly within that party's knowledge, can amount
to judicial admissions which will forever estop the party from contending the contrary in the current litigation."1 3
For example, in Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co. ,214 a plaintiff postal

worker's statements in a discovery deposition that he injured himself
when he tripped over rubber bumpers on defendant's loading dock
amounted to a judicial admission which estopped the plaintiff from
later showing that he had actually fallen over some metal plates.

Because the defendant had no responsibility for the rubber bumpers,
summary judgment for defendant was affirmed. 215 As the Hansen

N.E.2d 354 (related case). As stated by the Hansen court:
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party
about a concrete fact within that party's peculiar knowledge ....

The

frequently stated purpose of the doctrine of judicial admissions is to
eliminate the temptation to commit perjury ....

Thus, assertions made in

a deposition constitute binding judicial admissions only if they are unequivocal.
Hansen, 155 Il. App. 3d at 480, 508 N.E.2d at 303-304.
213. The following two cases illustrate under what circumstances a statement
made in a discovery deposition will and will not likely amount to a judicial admission.
Compare Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 71
I11.App. 3d 562, 390 N.E.2d 60 (1979) (plaintiff is estopped by a judicial admission,
made in his discovery deposition, that he first learned of his cause of action on a
date more than one year prior to his filing suit) with Young v. Pease, 114 I11.App.
3d 120, 448 N.E.2d 586 (1983) (statements made by a plaintiff in his discovery
deposition as to when he first found out about his cause of action were not so clear
and unequivocal as to amount to judicial admissions that would estop plaintiff on
that issue).
214. 155 I11.App. 3d 475, 508 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist. 1987). This case was before
the appellate court on two occasions. Hansen I, 155 11. App. 3d 475, 508 N.E.2d
301 (1987), involved an unsuccessful appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment
granted to the defendant architect because of plaintiff's judicial admission made in
his discovery deposition. Hansen 11, 164 11. App. 3d 884, 518 N.E.2d 354 (1987),
involved an equally unsuccessful appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment
granted to the defendant construction company. In Hansen II, the plaintiff offered
the deposition of an eyewitness to contradict his judicial admission. The court held
that the law was "indisputable" that he could not use the deposition to relieve
himself from the effect of a judicial admission. Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 164
I11.App. 3d 884, 887, 518 N.E.2d 354, 355 (1987).
215. See Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 155 I11.App. 3d 475, 479, 508 N.E.2d
301, 303 (1987). In Hansen I, several days after the plaintiff gave his deposition, he
returned to the post office, for the first time in three and one-half years since the
accident, and inspected the premises. After this visit, his attorney sent a letter to
defendant's counsel stating that his client had been confused and that the rubber
bumpers his client described were at his previous place of employment, not at the
station where he was injured. The letter stated he had actually caught his heel on a

HeinOnline -- 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 203 1989-1990

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

court noted, "a party cannot create a factual dispute by contradicting
a previously made judicial admission... ",216 and "a party may not
create a genuine issue of material fact by taking contradictory posi-

tions, nor may he remove a factual question from consideration just

' 217
to raise it anew when convenient.
Cases such as Trapkus v. Edstrom's Inc.2 18 seem not to acknowledge the possibility of judicial admissions occurring in discovery
depositions because of Supreme Court Rule 2010) which states,

"Disclosure of any matter obtained by discovery is not conclusive,
but may be contradicted by other evidence. 21 9 The concern may be
that the remedy is too drastic for a slip of the tongue. However, the

case law cautions that, if the court concludes there was a slip of the
tongue or an actual mistake, it should not find a judicial admission. 220
The line of cases recognizing judicial admissions in discovery
depositions was not mentioned in Trapkus. Moreover, there is a long

line of cases that recognize the possibility of such admissions in
discovery depositions. 22' These cases indicate that a trial judge has

discretion in determining whether the facts before him give rise to a
dock-plate assembly.
One and one-half years later, the defendant moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed a counter affidavit asserting that, after refreshing his recollection, he
realized he had actually tripped over the metal plates, not the rubber bumpers. The
defendant's motion was granted and affirmed on appeal. Id. at 478-79, 508 N.E.2d
at 302-03.
216. Hansen I, 155 I1l. App. 3d at 480, 508 N.E.2d at 303-04 (citations omitted).
217. Hansen I, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 480, 508 N.E.2d at 304 (quoting Schmahl v.
A.V.C. Enter., Inc., 148 I11.
App. 3d 324, 331, 499 N.E.2d 572, 577 (1986)).
218. 140 I11.
App. 3d 720, 489 N.E.2d 340 (1986).
219. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 2010) (1987).
220. See McCormack v. Haan, 23 I11.
App. 2d 87, 97, 161 N.E.2d 599, 604
(1959) ("[Tlhe doctrine of judicial admissions ...

requires the most thoughtful study

for its sound application lest injustice be done on the strength of a chance statement
made by a nervous unreflecting party.") (citing J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2594a (3rd ed.). However, the appellate court's conclusion that the plaintiff,
nevertheless, made a judicial admission on the stand was reversed by the supreme
court which held that whether a party has made a judicial admission "depends upon
an evaluation of all his testimony .... not just a part of it," as well as an evaluation
of all the testimony of the other witnesses and their opportunity to observe the facts
about which they testify. McCormack v. Haan, 20 Ill. 2d 75, 78, 169 N.E.2d 239,
241 (1960).
221. See, e.g., Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 164 11. App. 3d 884, 518 N.E.2d
354 (1987); Hansen v. Ruby Constr. Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 475, 508 N.E.2d 301
(1987); Young v. Pease, 114 Ill. App. 3d 120, 448 N.E.2d 586 (1983); Tom Olesker's
Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 71 Ill.
App. 3d 562, 390
N.E.2d 60 (1979); Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 11, 170 N.E.2d 393, 398
(1960); Meier v. Pocius, 17 Il.App. 2d 332, 150 N.E.2d 215 (1958).
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judicial admission and also counsel that care be used in the application
of such device so that injustice is not done.
In addition to deposition statements giving rise to judicial admissions, two recent cases provide concrete examples of the long known
principle that lawyers can be held to have made judicial admissions
binding on their clients based either upon what they say in open court
or on what they put in pleadings.
The case of Lowe v. Kang,222 an automobile-parking lot knockdown case, presents the rather unusual situation in which an attorney's
statement during closing argument was held to be a judicial admission
of liability estopping the client from contending to the contrary and
resulting in a directed verdict on liability. In closing argument, defense
counsel made numerous acknowledgements of the negligence of his
client: "There is no question that there was fault on the part of both
parties to this occurrence." "I'm not trying to say that Stephen Kang
did nothing wrong .... There is no question he is somewhat responsible for this .... ,,;221 "As I've said, I believe this is a 50/50 case.
Both parties were equally at fault." 224 Apparently defense counsel was
trying to keep damages down by being frank with the jury. After
defense counsel's closing argument, plaintiff's motion for a directed
verdict as to defendant's liability was granted.
On appeal, the court affirmed the ruling that defense counsel
had made a judicial admission of his client's liability when he "stated
unambiguously that defendant was 'at fault' and 'responsible' for the
accident. ' 225 Accordingly, the court held that, not only did the
statements admit negligence, but also proximate cause and therefore
226
liability.
In Colt Constr. and Dev. Co. v. North, 227 the defendant's answer
to the plaintiff's counterclaim stated that the maximum amount owed
for certain work was $7,273. In a supporting affidavit defendant also
stated that he owed plaintiff no more than that figure. In affirming
a summary judgment for the plaintiff, the court stated, "In our
judgment, these admissions by [the defendant] in his answer and
attached affidavit constitute binding judicial admissions, and may
' 228
serve as the basis for summary judgment.
222. 167 11. App. 3d 772, 521 N.E.2d 1245 (1988).
App. 3d 772, 778, 521 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (1988).
223. Lowe v. Kang, 167 Ill.
224. Id.at 779, 521 N.E.2d at 1249.
225. Id.at 780, 521 N.E.2d at 1250.
226. See id.
227. 168 Ill. App. 3d 913, 915, 523 N.E.2d 90, 92 (1988).
228. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co. v. North, 168 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916-17, 523
N.E.2d 90, 92 (1988).
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A judicial admission may also arise in two other situations. At
least one case 229 suggests that a party's answer to interrogatories can
constitute a judicial admission if the answers are based on the party's
personal knowledge and are sufficiently definite and specific. However, the appellate court there refused to find a judicial admission on
the facts of the case and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's case for not being timely filed. In addition, failure to
respond to a request to admit facts within twenty-eight days under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 can have the effect of a judicial
admission and estop the party as to the facts requested. However,
courts have some discretion in deciding whether to allow a party to
file a response after the twenty-eight day period has expired.230
F.

EVIDENTIARY ADMISSIONS: LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS ADMISSIONS

In two recent cases, the appellate courts from the First and Fifth
Districts have differed over the question of whether a party's damaging legal conclusions can be admitted against that party as an
admission. The First District said no and the Fifth District said yes.
1. Party's Damaging "Conclusion" Not an Admission
In Ferry v. Checker Taxi Co. ,231 the defendant cab company took
a statement from the plaintiff the day after a collision between the
Checker cab in which the plaintiff was riding and another cab.
Although the plaintiff had sued Checker, in his out of court statement
he had blamed the other cab for the accident. The trial court granted
a motion in limine excluding reference to that portion of the statement
in which the plaintiff blamed the other cab driver. In affirming the
verdict for the plaintiff, the First District held that "Ferry's statement
placing the blame on the other driver was a legal conclusion ... and,
as such, properly inadmissible ' 23 2 as an admission. "[A] party's
reference to another person as being the one at fault is not an
admission, rather it is an improper expression on the ultimate issue
' 23 a
of the case and an invasion on the province of the jury.
229. See, e.g., Kirby v. Jarrett, 190 Ill. App. 3d 8, 545 N.E.2d 965 (1989).
230. See Sims v. City of Alton, 172 Ill. App. 3d 694, 526 N.E.2d 931 (1988);
Deboe v. Flick, 172 Il1. App. 3d 673, 526 N.E.2d 913 (1988); Magee v. Walbro, Inc.,
171 Ill. App. 3d 774, 525 N.E.2d 975 (1988).
231. 165 Ill. App. 3d 744, 520 N.E.2d 733 (1987).
232. Ferry v. Checker Taxi Co., 165 Ill. App. 3d 744, 749, 520 N.E.2d 733, 736
(1987).
233. Id. at 748, 520 N.E.2d at 736 (citing Schall v. Forrest, 51 Ill. App. 3d 613,
366 N.E.2d 1111 (1977)).
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TraditionalDefinition of Admission Not Followed
The court in Ferry, by not allowing the plaintiff's damaging
statement to be used against him, backs away from the general concept
that anything ever said by a party that is contrary to what that party
is contending at trial is an admission. If Ferry's statement had been
used by him only to place blame on another cab company, then
obviously such a statement is improper opinion. However, if his
statement is damaging to his own case, it is admissible as an admission.
The rule excluding opinion testimony by non-expert witnesses 234 should
not be used to prevent a party's damaging statement from being held
against that party. The fact that it was an opinion should go to
weight, not admissibility. 23" In addition, even if a party has no personal
knowledge of the matters stated in the opinion, the admission is still
admissible because an admission need not be based on "personal
knowledge.' '236
2.

3. Party's Conclusion Can be an Admission
A contrary approach, and one consistent with the traditional
definition of an admission, was followed in Wright v. Stokes. 237 In
reversing a jury verdict awarding defendant motorist damages and
denying damages to plaintiff, the Fifth District held that the trial
judge should have admitted defendant's guilty plea to a traffic ticket
given to him in connection with the accident, even though the defendant received supervision and the underlying charge was dismissed
without an adjudication of guilt. As to the defendant's contention
that his plea was merely a legal conclusion and that a legal conclusion
is not an admission, the court held that "the use of the term 'fault'
does not constitute a legal conclusion which is inadmissible as an
admission. It has been held that a party's statement that he may have
been at fault can constitute an admission. ''238
234. See 7 J.WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1917 at 10 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978); see
2d 217, 221, 483 N.E.2d
also Freeding-Skokie Roll Off Service v. Hamilton, 108 I11.
524, 526 (1985) (acknowledging this rule).
235. Admissibility would turn on the fact that what was said was damaging.
That the statement was unlikely to be true would go to how much credence the trier
would give it. This is similar to the rationale for allowing non-vicarious admissions
to be admitted against a party where what the party said was not based on personal
knowledge. See section V.B.2 of this article.
236. Casey v. Burns, 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 324, 129 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1955).
App. 3d 887, 522 N.E.2d 308 (1988).
237. 167 I11.
App. 3d 887, 892, 522 N.E.2d 308, 311 (1988)
238. Wright v. Stokes, 167 I11.
App. 2d 267, 223 N.E.2d 300 (1966)).
(citing Asher v. Stromberg, 78 I11.
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Wright v. Stokes: Proper View of Admissions

It would seem that the correct approach, and the one most
consistent with the definition of an admission, is that followed by the
Fifth District. When a party makes a damaging conclusory statement,
it should generally be admissible as an admission because the party
can always take the stand and explain the reason why it was made.
The fact that the statement is a legal (or medical) conclusion should
not disqualify its use as an admission if it is the party himself who
makes the statement. Such an approach is consistent with the basis
for admitting admissions: anything a party ever says or does prior to
trial that is inconsistent with what he is contending at trial is admissible
9
against him as an admission. 23
5.

Conclusion May be Excludable Where Admission is Vicarious

If, however, the damaging statement is not made personally by
the party but is a vicarious admission made by an agent or servant,
then it makes sense to exclude it if it is a "conclusory" statement
that goes beyond the "authority" given to the speaker or goes beyond
things that fall within the scope of the speaker's employment. If the
damaging statement is the personal statement of a party, however,
there should be no reason to ask whether the party has "authorized"
his own statement or has made a statement beyond his own "competence." In short, if the statement is one made personally by a party,
there seems to be no good reason to prevent the jury from hearing a
damaging but perhaps extravagant or conclusory statement made by
that party.
G. CROSS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE DIRECT TO ELICIT AN
ADMISSION IS IMPROPER

In Cuellar v. Hout,240 the court reaffirmed the principle that
admissions, as substantive evidence, should be introduced as a part
of a party's case in chief, not on cross-examination during the other
party's case in chief if the cross-examiner has to go beyond the scope
of the direct to elicit the damaging material. A party may go beyond
the scope of the direct to elicit impeaching material,241 but not to
bring out admissions; they belong in the examiner's case in chief.
However, if cross does not go beyond the scope of the direct (or an

239. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
240. 168 Ill. App. 3d 416, 522 N.E.2d 322 (1988).
241. See People v. Hudson, 171 I11.App. 3d 1029, 1037, 526 N.E.2d 164, 169
(1987), appeal denied, 121 I11.2d 577, 526 N.E.2d 835 (1988).
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admission is elicited as part of proper impeachment questioning), then
any admissions elicited on cross are properly admitted as part of the
24 2
cross-examination.
In Cuellar,243 the court held that there was no error in excluding
testimony of an admission when the plaintiff sought to extract the
admission on cross-examination of a defense witness and had to go
beyond the scope of the direct to do so. Apparently the plaintiff had
not attempted to prove the admission as part of its own case in
chief. 2" "Cross-examination in which a party attempts to put its
the scope of the
theory of a case before a jury, but which is beyond
'245
improper.
is
witness,
the
of
direct examination
VI.

HEARSAY UNDER Wilson v. Clark (Federal Rules of Evidence
803 and 705); EXPERT'S OPINION

With the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 in
Wilson v. Clark,246 experts are allowed to base their opinions on data
that has not been admitted in evidence. For unadmitted data to be
the basis for an opinion, it need only be "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer247
ences."
The principal issues that have arisen under this rule include the
following:
(a) What kind of inadmissible or unadmitted evidence can
an expert rely on in giving his or her opinion?

(b) What does "data reasonably relied on by experts in the
field" include, and how is that to be determined? and

(c) To what extent can an expert describe to the jury, on
direct examination, the inadmissible or unadmitted evidence
on which his or her opinion is based?
It is clear that, although an expert may rely on certain unadmitted

evidence in giving his opinion, only that opinion, not the unadmitted
242. See id. This is implicit in the notion that if a matter is important enough
for the party being cross-examined to mention it on direct, then the cross-examiner
ought to be able to bring out related items on cross that put what was just said on
direct in context.
243. 168 II1.App. 3d 416, 522 N.E.2d 322 (1988).
244. Plaintiff also apparently did not ask to reopen its case to put the admission
in evidence after it had been ruled out on cross-examination.
245. Cuellar v. Hout, 168 I11.App. 3d 416, 425, 522 N.E.2d 322, 328 (1988)
(citing Brynlesen v. Carrol Constr., 27 I11.2d 566, 569, 190 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1963).
246. 84 11. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
247. FED. R. Evm. 703.
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data, is admissible as substantive evidence.2 48 The unadmitted data
may be admitted under certain circumstances to "illustrate or explain"
the expert's testimony, but it is not substantive evidence.
For example, in Henry v. Brenner,249 a testifying physician could
properly rely on medical records made by staff physicians at a clinic
in forming his opinion as to the plaintiff because such records were
commonly used and relied upon by the medical staff at the clinic.
The physician could also testify to the contents of those records
because such inadmissible hearsay was "admitted solely to illustrate
and explain his opinion. ' 250 The court acknowledged that placing
otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury "raises a serious potential for abuse." ' 2 Here, however, the inadmissible hearsay was a
medical record prepared by a disinterested third party, and the doctor
customarily relied upon reports from other staff doctors whom he

trusted .252
In some cases it will be reversible error to refuse to allow an
expert to recite the hearsay to illustrate the basis for the opinion.253
In People v. Anderson,25 4 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
trial court improperly refused to allow the defendant's psychiatric
expert to disclose the facts and opinions contained in reports on which
he relied. 255 The reports included evaluations by psychiatrists and
counselors made while the defendant was in the army and in jail,
reports by the State's psychiatric experts, and information regarding
25 6
a prior criminal offense.
To refuse to allow the expert to refer "to the contents of the
materials upon which he relied ' 2 7 compels him "to appear to base
his diagnosis upon reasons which are flimsy and inconclusive when in
fact they may not be. ' 258 "Absent a full explanation of the expert's

248. See Mayer v. Baisier, 147 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154, 497 N.E.2d 827, 831
(1986).
249. 138 Ill. App. 3d 609, 486 N.E.2d 934 (1985).
250. Henry v. Brenner, 138 Ill. App. 3d 609, 614, 486 N.E.2d 934, 937 (1985).
251. Id. at 615, 486 N.E.2d at 937.
252. See id. The court also acknowledged that the use of a limiting instruction
helped to control any possible abuse.
253. See People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487. At trial, the psychiatrist was only allowed
to state that "he utilized these reports." Id.
256. See id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487.
257. Id. at 10, 495 N.E.2d at 489.
258. Id. at 11, 495 N.E.2d at 489 (quoting State v. Myers, 159 W. Va. 353, 358,
222 S.E.2d 300, 304 (1976)).
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reasons, including underlying facts and opinions, the jury has no way
of evaluating the expert testimony . . . and is therefore faced with a
'meaningless conclusion' by the witness.'' 25 9 Any problems with this
26
approach can be resolved by proper limiting instructions. 0
The supreme court noted that, "A trial judge, of course, need
not allow the expert to recite secondhand information when its
probative value in explaining the expert's opinion pales beside its
' ' 26
likely prejudicial impact or its tendency to create confusion. 1
Also, in In re Scruggs,262 a commitment proceeding, a psychologist was properly allowed to rely on inadmissible third person hearsay
statements and statements by hearsay declarants he had talked to
concerning the patient. The manager of an apartment building told
the psychologist that the patient had opened her apartment door in
the nude to let in a carpenter and had left her keys lying on the
counter in the building office and that her lease had been terminated
as a result of these incidents. In holding that it was permissible to let
the expert disclose to the jury the hearsay that the psychologist relied
upon for his opinion that the patient was a danger to herself, the
court stated:
If it is normal and reasonable within a field of expertise to
rely upon the statements of others, then opinions premised on
those statements must necessarily be allowed to demonstrate
their factual underpinnings. The facts underlying the opinion
provide no substantive proof at trial, but are instead limited
to establishing the worth of the opinion derived therefrom.
They may either enhance or diminish the resultant opinion
263
and the expert delivering it and that is their sole purpose.
As was noted in Anderson, courts can give limiting instructions
on the hearsay statements used to illustrate the basis for an expert's
opinion, and need not allow the hearsay statements in at all if their
probative or illustrative force is outweighed by the danger of improper
use or confusion by the jury.' 6
A. CAN AN EXPERT'S OPINION CONVERT HEARSAY TO SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE?

A case has raised the question whether, under rule 703, an expert's
opinion can convert the hearsay he relies on into substantive evidence.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 11, 495 N.E.2d at 489.
See id. at 12, 495 N.E.2d at 490.
Id.
151 Il.App. 3d 260, 502 N.E.2d 1108 (1986).
In re Scruggs, 151 Iil. App. 3d 260, 263, 502 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (1986).,
See People v. Anderson, 113 I11.
2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986).
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The answer to that question should be, "No, it cannot, but it should
not make any difference." As long as the expert's opinion is reasonably based on the data (which itself must be of a kind reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field), the data does not have to be
"converted" into substantive evidence. The expert's opinion is substantive evidence; the data do not have to be. However, one case
appears to take a different view.
In Mayer v. Baisier,265 plaintiff's expert's testimony was based
exclusively on his review of hospital records and an autopsy report,
neither of which were introduced into evidence. The expert's opinion
was that, because the records showed the defendant surgeon had seen
the patient only once from the 18th of October until December 31st
when plaintiff died, such conduct was "definitely and strongly a
deviation below the accepted standards of care.' 266 A directed verdict
was entered on the ground that the plaintiff had not established a
prima facie case. This was affirmed on appeal.
The plaintiff argued that his expert's opinion was admissible as
substantive evidence under rule 703 and such evidence made a prima
26 7
facie case. The court in Mayer concluded that Wilson v. Clark
allows an expert to use hearsay as a basis for his opinion but that the
2 68
opinion cannot convert the hearsay into substantive evidence.
The appellate court, noting that "the trial court properly permitted . . . [the expert] to testify that he relied upon the decedent's
hospital records in formulating his opinion ' 269 and was correct in
allowing him "to testify to the contents of those records in explaining
the basis of his opinion, 21 70 concluded, however, that the "testimony
did not transform the hospital records ... into substantively admissible evidence.' '27 This testimony was admissible only for the limited
purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. Accordingly the court
held that the expert's "testimony cannot be considered substantive
proof of [defendant's] alleged negligent conduct ' 272 and, therefore, is
27
insufficient to establish a prima facie case for negligence. 1
Questions raised by this opinion include: (1) If the opinion does
not come in as substantive evidence, for what purpose is the opinion
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

147 I11.
App. 3d 150, 497 N.E.2d 827 (1986).
Mayer v. Baisier, 147 Iil. App. 3d 150, 154, 497 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1986).
84 I11.
2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
See Mayer, 147 Ill. App. 3d 150, 156-57, 497 N.E.2d 827, 830-31 (1986).
Id. at 157, 497 N.E.2d at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158, 497 N.E.2d at 832.
See id.
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admitted at all? What is it that the "contents of the records" are
illustrating? (2) If the medical records are reasonably reliable, why
can not the expert base his opinion on them? (3) If medical records
are not reasonably reliable, what was the basis for the Wilson v.
Clark opinion? (4) If the expert's opinion would have been admitted
if the attorney had had the hospital records admitted, is the result in
Mayer inconsistent with the court's intent in Wilson v. Clark to lessen
the need for introduction of medical records?
The question raised here is whether Mayer v. Baisier misapplied
rule 703 to throw out not only the underlying hearsay but also the
expert opinion. This appears to be the kind of case Wilson v. Clark
was designed to cover. It also seems clearly inconsistent with the
supreme court's ruling in Melecosky v. McCarthy Bros.2 4 that experts
can rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming their opinions. Moreover,
the fact that the opinion was being given for "litigation" rather than
medical purposes should not be fatal given that experts testifying in
court will generally be giving their opinions for purposes of litigation.
The basic problem with this opinion is that the court seems
unwilling to accept the consequences of recognizing rule 703. This
rule allows an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible evidence
(hearsay) if it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
witness' profession. Such an opinion is admissible as substantive
evidence. In Mayer, the expert's opinion, based on the hospital
records, was that the surgeon had breached a duty of care by
abandoning the patient after the operation. Although the court found
the opinion admissible, it found that, despite the expert testimony,
there was no prima facie case.

274. 115 Ill. 2d 209, 503 N.E.2d 355 (1986). The Illinois Supreme Court again
affirmed the propriety of experts basing their opinion on unadmitted hearsay statements. "Although Wilson dealt only with the admissibility of an expert opinion based
upon hospital records, the language of the Wilson opinion indicates a general approval
of the rationale of rules 703 and 705. Rule 703 allows expert witnesses to base an
opinion upon inadmissible facts or data." Melecosky v. McCarthy Bros., 115 Ill. 2d
209, 215, 503 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1986) (citations omitted).
The court held that it was reversible error to bar plaintiff from using the evidence
deposition of a non-treating physician whose opinions were based in part upon
plaintiff's subjective statements. The court relied on rule 703 to overturn long standing
decisional law that a non-treating physician could testify only about "objective"
symptoms and could not give an opinion based on the "subjective" symptoms of the
patient. The court concluded that "since experts in their own practice normally rely
on such [subjective hearsay statements] it is consistent with the purposes of Rule
703" to allow the doctor to rely on them in arriving at his medical opinion. Id. at
216, 503 N.E.2d at 358.
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If the court believed that the expert's opinion, based on a lack
of entries in the hospital record, was not sufficient to show abandonment by the surgeon, it should have found that it was unreasonable
for the expert to draw such a conclusion and excluded the opinion. 75
With the opinion excluded, there could have been no prima facie
case. However, if the court had excluded the opinion because it was
not a reasonable one to draw from the data, it would have had to
exclude the opinion even if the records had been admitted into
evidence.
What the court apparently did, however, was to conclude that
the opinion was based on hearsay, therefore it could not be substantive
evidence, thus there was no prima facie case. The court stated:
"Massell's reliance upon and testimony regarding certain contents of
the hospital records was permissible, ' 27 6 however this testimony "did
not transform the hospital records . . . into substantively admissible
evidence.... ",277 The implication is that the records must be admissible to allow this opinion. Therefore, the unavoidable conclusion is
that the court found the opinion was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case because it was based on hearsay. This is the exact opposite
of what rule 703 permits.
The question remains, should the outcome of a case like this
depend on the medical records actually being admitted in evidence
before the expert can base an opinion on them? If so, will medical
records have to actually be admitted in all cases again? Such a result
is inconsistent with the supreme court's apparent intent in Wilson v.
Clark to make it easier for experts to base opinions on unadmitted
hospital records rather than to make it easier to get the records
themselves admitted through the testimony of a custodian under rule
236.278
A different approach to the problem was taken in People v.
Sassu. 2 9 In Sassu, a medical expert testified as to the results of a
blood test performed by a Canadian laboratory that showed no traces
of marijuana in the blood of either murder victim. The expert received
the test results verbally and testified to them in court. To the defen-

275. But cf. FED. R. EvrD. 803(6) (absence of an entry in a business record
about an event is not excludable as hearsay to show non-occurrence of the event if
an entry would regularly be made if the event had occurred).
276. Mayer v. Baisier, 147 Ill. App. 3d 150, 157, 497 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1986).
277. Id. at 157, 497 N.E.2d at 831.
278. See supra note 246 and accompanying text; see also People v. Anderson
113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986).
279. 151 11. App. 3d 199, 502 N.E.2d 1047 (1986).
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dant's contention that the expert was thus testifying to hearsay, the
court stated:
With respect to the hearsay contention, since the Illinois
Supreme Court's adoption in 1981 of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, Illinois courts have permitted expert witnesses to give an opinion based upon either firsthand or
secondhand facts not in evidence, provided that the information relied upon is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in their particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
2
the subjects.

0

Because, in giving his opinion, "Dr. Schaffer stated that the infor-

mation he received from the Canadian forensic laboratory was of the
type customarily relied upon in his profession, ' 281 the court found no
error in allowing Dr. Schaffer's expert testimony as to the test
1
results .282
Thus, although clearly some hearsay can be relied on and disclosed to the trier of fact for illustrative purposes, the type of hearsay

and the extent it can be used to form the basis for the expert's opinion
are still matters to be fleshed out. Nonetheless, the Anderson and
Melecosky cases suggest the Illinois Supreme Court favors a broad
interpretation of the Rule that will allow experts a great degree of
latitude in relying on hearsay statements.
VII.

JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION

As EVIDENCE

Illinois law allows certain criminal convictions to be used as
substantive evidence in civil cases where the facts at issue are the
same. The criminal conviction can be considered as evidence of any
fact necessary to the conviction.2 3 The conviction
need not be a
2 84
felony, but it must be for a "serious" offense.

280. People v. Sassu, 151 I11.App. 3d 199, 205, 502 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52
(1986).
281. Id. at 205-06, 502 N.E.2d at 1052.
282. See Sassu, 151 I11.App. 3d 199, 502 N.E.2d 1047 (1986).
283. See, e.g., Smith v. Andrews, 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160 (1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1029 (1966) (rape conviction admissible in civil case as prima
facie evidence defendant had in fact committed a rape).
284. See Thorton v. Paul, 74 I11. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978) (serious
misdemeanor convictions are admissible as substantive evidence; defendant bartender's conviction for misdemeanor battery should have been admitted in a later civil
case as prima facie evidence that the bartender's striking the plaintiff was a battery,
was intentional, and was not covered by the insured's policy); Bay State Ins. Co. v.
Wilson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 440 N.E.2d 131 (1982), aff'd, 96 Ill. 2d 487, 461
N.E.2d 880 (1983) (battery conviction, a class 3 felony, admissible in civil case to
show shooting by insured was intentional and not covered by the policy).
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The criminal convictions do not act as an estoppel in the later
civil case unless they are being introduced against the criminal himself
and he is a party in the civil case. 285 The person against whom they
are introduced can put in evidence to contradict the facts inherent in
the criminal conviction.
This hearsay exception applies to criminal convictions only, not
pleas. 286 However, a guilty plea in a criminal case may be admitted in
287
a later civil trial as an admission if it is relevant to the factual issues.
In such a situation, a plea of guilty to even a minor traffic offense
such as running a stop sign, if relevant, will be admissible as an
admission.2 8 Thus, unlike a conviction for a minor traffic offense

285. If a criminal conviction against one defendant, e.g., the driver of a grocery
truck convicted for involuntary manslaughter in running down the pedestrian (plaintiff's decedent), is introduced in evidence against another party, e.g., the grocery
store owner sued by plaintiff in connection with the pedestrian's death, the conviction
cannot estop the grocery store owner since he was not a party to the criminal case
and could not have cross-examined witnesses or introduced evidence. It can, however,
be introduced against the store owner as evidence of any fact necessary to the
rendition of the criminal judgment, e.g., reckless conduct of the driver that caused
the death of the pedestrian. However, if the driver himself was being sued in the
civil suit, his criminal conviction could well estop him from relitigating these issues
since he had already done so and the issues had been resolved against him beyond a
reasonable doubt.
286. "Proof of a criminal conviction is admissible in a civil case as prima facie
evidence of the facts upon which the conviction was based." Rockford Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Shattuck, 188 Ill. App. 3d 787, 789, 544 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1989). The criminal
conviction must be for a felony or at least a "serious" misdemeanor. See supra notes
283-284 and accompanying text.
287. See People v. Powell, 107 Ill. App. 3d 418, 470 N.E.2d 1258 (1982). "A
guilty plea to a traffic offense is a judicial admission which, although not conclusive,
is proper evidence against [the driver] in a civil proceeding arising from the same
incident." Id. at 419, 470 N.E.2d at 1259-60 (Plea of guilty to DUI in traffic court
case can be used as an admission in a civil implied consent hearing). Note, however,
the guilty plea will be a judicial admission (will create an estoppel and be conclusive)
only in the case in which it is entered, i.e., the traffic court case. When the traffic
court admission is used in the civil case, as the court points out, it will not be
"conclusive," it will not be a judicial admission.
288. The introduction of the plea differs in theory from introduction of the judgment entered thereon. The judgment of conviction constitutes
a hearsay exception when offered to prove that any facts essential to the
judgment have been previously found to exist; whereas the plea is offered
to prove only that the offender admitted facts constituting guilt and not
that such facts were adjudicated to exist ....

The plea would not estop the

driver from offering testimony to explain the plea, which the trier-of-fact
may consider along with all other evidence.
Id. at 420, 470 N.E.2d at 1260 (1982). Note, the judgment of conviction for a minor
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when no plea has been entered, pleas of guilty for such minor offenses
can have a second life as part of a related civil case.
A. TRAFFIC CONVICTION NOT ADMISSIBLE IN CIVIL CASE; TRAFFIC
PLEAS ARE ADMISSIBLE

The early cases indicate that only felonies or "serious" misdemeanor convictions can later be used as substantive evidence. In
Hengels v. Gilski,28 9 the court held that a "hit and run" conviction
of the defendant driver could not be used as substantive evidence in
a related civil case because the charges may not have been taken
seriously enough to make the findings of fact reliable for use in other
cases. The court observed that a "traffic court conviction will often
result from expediency, convenience and compromise; the constitutional safeguards are often perfunctory and the defendant's opportunity and motive to defend vigorously are often lacking. ' ' 290 The
court also held that a traffic court conviction does not possess:
the adequate assurance of reliability necessary to justify its
admission into evidence at a later civil trial based upon the
same facts. To hold otherwise, we believe could conceivably
turn a mechanical and summary traffic court hearing into the
cornerstone of a significant civil action filed under the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. 2 9'
Thus, although pleas for any offense, serious or not, are admissible as admissions, traffic convictions for "non-serious" traffic
offenses are not admissible as evidence of the facts found. The court
in Hengels did not state what kind of traffic offense would be serious
enough, but it is likely that a conviction for driving under the influence
might rise to that level.
VIII.

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST

Declarations against interest are like admissions in that they are
statements "hurtful" to the declarant. They are hurtful, however,
only to declarants who are not parties to the lawsuit at issue. State-

traffic offense, (e.g., running a stop sign) would probably not estop the driver from
contesting that fact in a related civil case because the stakes were probably not high
enough to say he had his one "day in court" on that issue. However, if the conviction
were for a serious traffic offense, perhaps DUI, it might raise an estoppel against
the convicted defendant in a subsequent civil case arising out of the same incident.
App. 3d 894, 469 N.E.2d 708 (1984).
289. 127 Ill.
App. 3d 894, 910, 469 N.E.2d 708, 721 (1984).
290. Hengels v. Gilski, 127 Ill.
291. Id. at 910, 469 N.E.2d at 721.
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ments hurtful or damaging to a party, or more specifically the party's
case, are considered admissions. A statement hurtful or damaging to
a declarant who is not a party cannot be an admission but may
qualify as a declaration against interest.
For a non-party declarant's damaging statement to be admissible
as a declaration against interest, the declarant must be unavailable
and the statement must have been against his pecuniary or proprietary
interest when made. 292 This represents another principal difference
between an admission and a declaration against interest in that an
admission need not be hurtful or damaging when made.
A.

DECLARATIONS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST

Until recently, declarations against interest had to be against the
pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant. 293 The statement
had to hit the declarant "in the pocketbook," and an acknowledgement of a debt was a clear example. 294 Declarations against so called
"penal interest," that is, out of court confessions by absent declarants
used to exculpate a defendant currently on trial, generally were not
admitted in Illinois unless required by the interests of justice.295
However, in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People
v. Bowel ,296 such declarations are now admissible if they comply with
the requirements set out in that opinion.
Previous to Bowel, Illinois courts held that declarations against
interest to exculpate an accused could be admitted only if all of the
following criteria were met: (1) the statement had to be against the
interest of the declarant; (2) it had to have been made spontaneously
to a close friend, as opposed to a stranger; (3) it had to be corroborated by circumstantial evidence; and (4) the declarant had to be
available. 297 One of the curious aspects of requiring "availability"
before admitting the declaration is that the very thing previously
required for a declaration to be admissible (unavailability) was now
being discarded.
In Bowel, the court reiterated the four requirements for admissibility, but noted that there was some uncertainty whether all four
requirements had to be met before the statement could be admitted.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
People v.

See Buckley v. Cronkite, 74 Ill. App. 3d 487, 393 N.E.2d 60 (1979).
See id. at 492, 393 N.E.2d at 65.
Id.
See People v. Tate, 87 Il. 2d 134, 143-44, 429 N.E.2d 470, 475 (1981).
111 11. 2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986).
See People v. Foster, 66 Ill. App. 3d 292, 383 N.E.2d 788 (1978) (citing
Ireland, 38 Il. App. 3d 616, 348 N.E.2d 277 (1976)).
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At least one case, People v. Foster,298 had so held. The Bowel court,
however, ruled that all four indicia need not be present to admit the
declaration: "The four factors which the [Supreme] [C]ourt enumerated in Chambers v. Mississippi, are to be regarded simply as indicia
of trustworthiness and not as requirements of admissibility. ' '2 After
Bowel, the question to be resolved by a court considering the admissibility of such a declaration is "whether the declaration was made
under circumstances that provide 'considerable assurance' of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness."'00
Federal rule 804(b)(3) requires that declarations against penal
interest to exculpate an accused be, in fact, supported by "corroborating circumstances" that "clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement." '0 1 Given the language in Bowel, the Illinois and federal
standard for determining reliability seem very close. However, under
the federal rule, the declarant must be unavailable. 30 2 Under Bowel,
the availability of the declarant for cross-examination can be considered a plus in favor of admitting the statement.
IX.

DOES ILLINOIS RECOGNIZE

A

"CATCHALL"

EXCEPTION?

The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize what has been referred
to as a "catchall" exception to the hearsay rule for those out of court
statements that do not meet the requirements of any traditional
exception but which do have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" to exceptions already recognized. 30 3 Those exceptions
already recognized are set out in 803(1) to (23), and 804(b)(1) to (4).
Probably, statements having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness to 801(d)(1) prior statements as non-hearsay, and
801(d)(2), admissions, would also qualify for admissibility under the
catchall exception, even though these statements are considered "nonhearsay" and not exceptions.
To qualify under this catchall exception, a statement must meet
several requirements: the statement must be of a material fact; it must
be more probative on the point than other evidence the proponent
can procure through reasonable effort; and the general purposes of
the rules and the interests of justice must be served by admitting the
298. 66 11. App. 3d at 295, 383 N.E.2d at 789 (1978).
2d 58, 67, 488 N.E.2d 995, 999 (1986) (citing
299. People v. Bowel, 111 Ill.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1973)).
2d at 67, 488 N.E.2d at 1000.
300. Bowel, 111 Ill.
301. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
302. FED. R. Evin. 804(b).
303. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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statement. 3°4 However, the statement seeking admission must also
have "equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness."3 5 This is perhaps
the most important criterion to be met. Thus, under the federal
catchall rule, the question arises, to what are these "guarantees of
trustworthiness" to be equivalent? Presumably the guarantees of the
statement to be admitted must be equivalent to those that accompany
statements qualifying under all the other exceptions and 801(d)(l) and
801 (d)(2).
The language "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee in place of
"comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" contained
in the original draft of the rules submitted to Congress. 3°6 It is likely
that the Senate intended the added language to make it clear that this
is not to be a vague, "open ended," general trustworthiness type of
exception. Moreover, the Senate said as much in its comments to the
Rule in its report. "It is intended that the residual hearsay exception
will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." 3 7
There is surprisingly little case law in Illinois dealing with the
catchall notion. One case which raised the issue is In re T.D. 308 In
this juvenile case, the court held that the label on a tube of glue the
respondent was charged with sniffing "was sufficiently reliable and
trustworthy on its face to be considered an exception to the hearsay
rule." 3°9 The label was therefore admitted to prove what the tube
contained. In recognizing such an exception, the court did not cite
any Illinois authority for such a "trustworthiness" exception. The
court was impressed, however, by the fact that the substance in
question was hazardous and that the label was required by law to be
on the product. It therefore concluded that "the trustworthiness of
the label is beyond suspicion and though technically it does not meet
the requirements for a business record, it should be an exception from
' 310
the rule against hearsay.

Although no Illinois authority was cited in support of a general
trustworthiness exception, the court did note that its holding was
304. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Under 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
there is also a pretrial notice requirement for using a catchall exception.
305. FED. R. EvrD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
306. Report on the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Fed. Rules of Evidence,
S.Rep. No. 1277, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., p. 18 (1974); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7065.
307. Id.
308. 115 Ill. App. 3d 872, 450 N.E.2d 455 (1983).
309. Id. at 876, 450 N.E.2d at 458.
310. Id. at 877, 450 N.E.2d at 458.
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consistent with the general rule permitting the self-authentication of
trade inscriptions: "[ijnscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purported to
have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership,
control, or origin, should be considered self-authenticating." '' The
basis for allowing self-authentication is the day-to-day reliance by the
public on the accuracy of such items.
The State cited a line of cases from other jurisdictions which held
that writing on a product's label is competent proof of the product's
contents, thus extending the trade inscription rule to cover contents,
in addition to ownership, control, or origin. The court acknowledged
this line of cases, but did not find that the label was admissible as a
trade inscription. Instead, again stressing that the label was statutorily
that the label "was sufficiently trustworthy
required, it held simply
3' 12
exception.
to be an
Under the Federal Rule requiring circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to exceptions already recognized, a case
could probably be made that-under circumstances where contents
are not likely to be switched (such as glue, toothpaste, etc.)-a label
is just as trustworthy for proving contents as it is for proving origin,
ownership, or control. However, the court in In re T.D. chose not to
follow such a path. The importance of In re T.D. is that it is some
authority for the proposition that Illinois courts have recognized some
form of a catchall or residual exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover,
the Illinois Supreme Court, in United Electric Coal v. Industrial
Commission,31 a has also recognized a trustworthiness exception; however, it did so in an administrative hearing and without much discussion of the issue.
In United Electric Coal, the administrator allowed in evidence an
audiogram made by the plaintiff's doctor and a letter by the doctor
to the plaintiff's lawyer, describing plaintiff's condition and making
a diagnosis. In upholding the arbitrator's admission of this "hearsay,"
the court stated that "The rule against the admission of hearsay is
not absolute; under certain circumstances the probability of accuracy
and trustworthiness may serve as a substitute for cross-examination
under oath.13 14 The court therefore held that the exhibits were trust-

311. Id. at 877, 450 N.E.2d at 459 (citing E. CLEARY & M.
§ 902.6 at 498-99 (3d ed. 1979)).

GRAHAM, HANDBOOK

OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE

312. Id. at 878, 450 N.E.2d at 459.
313. 93 111.2d 415, 444 N.E.2d 115 (1982).
2d 415, 420, 444 N.E.2d 115,
314. United Elec. Coal v. Indus. Comm'n, 193 I11.
117 (1982).
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worthy and that the arbitrator did not err in allowing them into
evidence.
Although United Electric Coal dealt only with hearsay in administrative hearings and cited only an Industrial Commission case in
support of its holding, the implication is that the Illinois Supreme
Court would not be antagonistic to the notion of a catchall or residual
hearsay exception. Moreover, when the opinion in In re T.D. is also
taken into account, it is clear that there is some basis for the
development of such an exception in Illinois law. However, People v.
Redd3 5' refused to recognize a catchall or residual exception in connection with a prior inconsistent statement the State sought to use
substantively under section 115-10.1. Under this section, a prior
inconsistent statement can be used substantively if certain conditions
are met 16 and if the declarant appears as a witness and is subject to
cross-examination about the statement. The court held that because
the witness invoked his fifth amendment privilege he was "not subject
to effective cross-examination ' 31 7 and his inconsistent statement could
not be used substantively.
In the alternative, the State urged the court to adopt Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), a so-called catchall exception, as the law
of Illinois. The court declined to adopt this "residual exception to
the hearsay rule," noting that, "Our General Assembly has made a
determination that prior inconsistent statements may be admitted as
substantive evidence only when the requirements of section 115-10.1
'
are met." 318
The court went on to state that it was "unwilling to judicially
amend section 115-10.1 to include a catchall 'residual exception' to
the hearsay rule" 31 9 and that, "If a prior inconsistent statement is to
be admitted in Illinois in a criminal case against a defendant, the
statement must meet the requirements set out by the General Assembly
in section 115-10.1."320 Being very specific on this point, the court
declared that, "If the prior statement fails to meet these requirements,
it is not admissible as substantive evidence." 32'

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

People v.Redd, 135 Il1.
2d 252, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
People v.Redd, 135 Il.2d 252, 306, 553 N.E.2d 316, 340 (1990).
Id.at 313, 553 N.E.2d at 343.
Id.at 313, 553 N.E.2d at 344.
Id.at 313-14, 553 N.E.2d at 344.
Id.at 314, 553 N.E.2d at 344.
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Thus, the court indicates it is not willing to judicially fashion a
catchall exception to a legislatively created hearsay exception. The
implication is that, since the legislature created the exception in the
first place, it must decide whether it also wants an applicable catchall
exception. This sentiment would seemingly be applicable to such other
legislatively created exceptions as those allowing substantive use of
prior identifications under section 115-12, the hearsay exception under
section 115-10 for statements by a child under the age of thirteen in
cases involving sexual acts against such a child, and the hearsay
exception under section 115-13 for statements to medical personnel
by victims of sex offenses.
It is worth noting that even if the State had succeeded in
convincing the Court to adopt the federal catchall exception of Rule
804(b)(5), that catchall exception may well not have permitted the use
of the grand jury statements the State wanted admitted. This is so
because under the federal catchall exception, any statement admitted
must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
to a recognized exception. 3'2 Certainly, the grand jury testimony
sought to be used in Redd could not have "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" to former testimony since there was
no cross-examination at the grand jury. Moreover, it is unclear
whether it would have guarantees of trustworthiness substantially
equivalent to those of any other hearsay exception.
The federal catchall exception is not a general, open ended
"trustworthiness" exception.32 3 Thus, merely getting the court to
recognize a catchall exception will not make a statement admissible if
a defendant never had a chance to cross-examine the declarant and
the statements sought to be admitted are not similar to those already
recognized as exceptions.
If a catchall exception is to be recognized in Illinois, either by
the court for exceptions judicially created or by the legislature for
exceptions it has enacted, like the federal exception, it should not be
a general trustworthiness exception, but one that is limited to those
kinds of statements that have substantially equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness to those that already qualify for exception to the hearsay rule. 24

322.
323.
324.
40, para.

See supra text accompanying note 303.
See Huff v. White Motors, 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
This appears to be what the Illinois General Assembly has done with ch.
2312-13.1(3) "Hearsay Exception" in actions for an order of protection
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CONCLUSION

Many of the problems that have arisen with the hearsay rule can
be traced to a failure on the part of lawyers and judges to focus on
the basic elements of the hearsay rule when applying it: witness,
declarant, statement, matter asserted, purpose for which the statement
is offered, and possibility of cross-examination. Although most lawyers and judges can define hearsay as "an out of court statement
used to prove the truth of the matter asserted," this shorthand
definition does not provide much help in applying the rule to concrete
situations. For help, one needs to go to the basic principles that are
subsumed under that definition. It is only when one can parse the six
implicit elements of the rule for each situation, that one can be sure
the shorthand definition is being correctly applied. Failure to square
the shorthand definition with the implicit elements of the rule can
often lead to confusion and misunderstanding.
This article has attempted to make what is implicit in the rule,
explicit. It has attempted to do this, not just for the hearsay rule
itself, but also for some of the typical areas that have caused the
most trouble: admissions, prior statements, declarations against interest, Wilson v. Clark, judgments of conviction, and catchall considerations. It is the author's belief that a thorough understanding of
these implied principles will make for a better understanding of the
rule and a quicker, more accurate, use of the shorthand definitions
in everyday discussions of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.

under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-1 to
2313-5 (1989), brought "on behalf of a high risk adult with disabilities." This Section,
effective January 1, 1990, requires "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," notice of intent to use the Section, and lists examples of some guarantees
of trustworthiness in connection with recognizing a residual or catch all exception.
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